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Abstract
Services are ubiquitous. In daily life, we can find service provisioning every-
where such as online shopping, online storage, doctor, hotel, lawyer, restau-
rant, etc. With the development of Web 2.0 technology, a huge amount of
information about services has become available on the Internet. For in-
stance, on a review website people can discuss which restaurant serves the
best Chinese food; in a blog, an author posts an article about the experi-
ence of visiting a doctor. The abundance of services and the overload of
service information online, result in two main problems. The first problem
is service selection; the second one is the overload of consumer-driven infor-
mation which refers to information such as reviews, articles, assessments,
and discussions generated by service consumers.
The concept of trust is proposed to solve the two problems. The computa-
tional concept of trust is defined as a subjective probability, which makes a
prediction of the occurrence of an event such as a good service provisioning.
Software used for building and managing trust data related to service of-
ferings, is called Trust Management System (TMS). The first topic is trust
model. A trust model is the computing kernel of a TMS that calculates the
trust value of a service. Another significant topic regarding trust manage-
ment for services is the robustness of a TMS. Robustness of a TMS refers
to the ability of a TMS to cope with inaccuracy (deliberate or accidental)
in the consumer-provided information used for computing trust. There are
many trust models that have been proposed. I do not know of any sur-
vey analyzing and comparing different trust models with respect to trust in
services. In this thesis, 40 trust models are compared from both a theoret-
ical and a practical perspective, using criteria such as application context,
information representation, properties of trust evaluation, and robustness
of system. In addition, a trust model framework for service provisioning is
proposed. This framework is considered a meta-model covering all existing
trust models. A concrete trust model can be derived by instantiating the
meta-model.
In the thesis, four concrete services which cover both quantitative and qual-
itative services are studied. A quantitative service refers to a service the
quality of which can be measured objectively. For a qualitative service there
is no general agreed-upon objective measure for service quality. The first
case study is about Online File Storage Service (OFSS) which is categorized
as a quantitative service. The trust model, R-Rep, for a OFSS is proposed.
In order to mitigate manipulation, a statistics based detection mechanism,
named Baseline Sampling (BS), is introduced. In addition, when social
network information among users is available, Clique Identification (CI) is
used to detect manipulative groups. One e-commerce website, Taobao.com,
and two review websites, TripAdvisor.com and Dianping.com, are chosen as
case studies for trust building and managing in the context of qualitative
service. For each case, specific trust models which consider intrinsic ro-
bustness enhancement by designing special weight functions are proposed.
Meanwhile, machine learning-based extrinsic robustness enhancement is ap-
plied. Three types of machine learning approaches, clustering, classification
and Annotation-Auxiliary Clustering (AAClust), are applied to identify ma-
nipulative behavior.
Abstract
Dienstleistungen sind allgegenwa¨rtig. Im allta¨glichen Leben finden wir Di-
enstleistungen u¨berall, wie beim Internetshopping, Online-Datenspeicherung,
Arzt, Hotel, Anwalt, Restaurant, etc. Mit der Entwicklung des Web 2.0
wurde eine riesige Menge an Daten u¨ber Dienstleistungen verfu¨gbar. Zum
Beispiel ko¨nnen Nutzer auf einer Bewertungsseite diskutieren welches Restau-
rant die beste deutsche Ku¨che serviert; in einem Blog postet ein Autor seine
Erfahrungen eines Arztbesuchs. The Vielzahl von Dienstleistungen und das
U¨berangebot an Serviceinformationen im Internet, resultiert in zwei Haupt-
problemen. Das erste Problem ist die Serviceauswahl; das zweite Problem
ist das U¨berangebot an Onlineinformationen die von Konsumenten bere-
itgestellt wurden, und Reviews, Artikel, Bewertungen, und Diskussionen
umfassen.
Das Konzept des Vertrauens (Englisch: “Concept of Trust”) wird vorgeschla-
gen diese beiden Probleme zu lo¨sen. Das rechentechnische Konzept des
Vertrauens wird definiert als eine subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit, die eine
Vorhersage u¨ber das Eintreten eines Ereignisses, wie die einer guten Di-
enstleistung, trifft. Software die eingesetzt wird um Daten zu Vertrauen
aufzubauen und zu verwalten wird Vertrauensverwaltungssystem (Englisch:
“Trust Management System” (TMS)) genannt. Der erste Aspekt, den wir
untersuchen ist das Vertrauensmodel. Das Vertrauensmodel ist der rechner-
ische Kern eines TMS, das den Vertrauenswert einer Dienstleistung berech-
net. Ein anderer wichtiger Aspekt die Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit von Dienstleis-
tungen betreffend ist die Robustheit eines TMS. Robustheit eines TMS
bezieht sich auf die Fa¨higkeit eines TMS mit Ungenauigkeiten (beabsichtigte
oder unbeabsichtigte) in von Konsumenten bereitgestellten Informationen,
die fu¨r die Berechnung von Vertrauen benutzt werden, umzugehen. Es ex-
istiert bereits eine Vielzahl von Vertrauensmodellen. Uns ist keine Studie
bekannt, die die verschiedenen Vertrauensmodelle hinsichtlich ihrer Eignung
fr die Untersuchung von Vertrauen in Dienstleistungen analysiert und ver-
gleicht. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden 40 Vertrauensmodelle aus theo-
retischer und praktischer Sicht vergleichen, unter Anwendung verschiedener
Kriterien, wie Anwendungsbereich, Informationsdarstellung, Eigenschaften
der Vertrauensbewertung, und Robustheit des Systems. Desweiteren schla-
gen wir einen Vertrauensmodel Rahmenkonzept fu¨r Dienstleistungen vor.
Dieses Rahmenkonzept kann als Metamodel aller existierenden Vertrauensm-
odelle betrachtet werden. Ein konkretes Vertrauensmodel kann durch In-
stanziierung des Metamodels hergeleitet werden.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wurden vier konkrete Dienstleistungen, die sich
von quantitativen bis qualitativen Dienstleistungen erstrecken, untersucht.
Eine quantitative Dienstleistung beschreibt Dienstleistungen deren Qualita¨t
objektiv bewertet werden kann. Fu¨r eine qualitative Dienstleistung existiert
keine allgemein akzeptierte Messung der Qualita¨t. Die erste Fallstudie be-
fasst sich mit Onlinedatenspeicherungsdienstleistungen ODSD, welche als
quantitative Dienstleistung eingeordnet werden. Ein Vertrauensmodel R-
Rep fu¨r ODSD wird vorgeschlagen. Um Manipulation zu vermeiden fu¨hren
wir einen statistisch basierten Erkennungsmechanismus ein, das Baseline
Sampling. Wenn Informationen aus sozialen Netzwerken u¨ber Nutzer ver-
fgbar sind, schlagen wir zusa¨tzlich das Cliquen Identifizieren vor, um manip-
ulierende Gruppen zu identifizieren. Eine Elektronische-Handels-Webseite,
taobao.com, und zwei Bewertungswebseiten, TripAdvisor.com und Dian-
ping.com, wurden als Fallstudien zu Vertrauensbildung und Verwaltung im
Kontext der qualitativen Dienstleistungen ausgewa¨hlt. Fu¨r jeden Einzelfall
spezifische Vertrauensmodelle werden vorgeschlagen, die intrinsische Ro-
bustheitsverbesserung durch den Einsatz spezieller Gewichtungsfunktionen
beru¨cksichtigen. Weiterhin wird extrinsische Robustheitsverbesserung, das
auf Maschinenlernen basiert, angewandt. Drei Arten von Maschinenlernen-
Ansa¨tzen werden angewandt um manipulatives Verhalten zu identifizieren,
und zwar Clusterbildung, Klassifizierung und Annotations-Auxilia¨r-Clus-
terbildung.
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1Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Services are ubiquitous. In daily life, we can find service provisioning everywhere.
Consider a day in the life of Tim. In the morning, he takes bus to work, which belongs
to a transportation service. He works as a receptionist in a hotel. After work, he goes
to a restaurant with his girlfriend. Over dinner they decide to order prints of their
photos online. After he comes back home, he checks his e-mail and finds information
about a shoe sale at Amazon.com. Afterwards he finds that a tap in the bathroom is
broken. He wants to call a company to repair it. Within those few sentences sketching a
fairly typical day in modern life, as many as seven types of service have been mentioned.
Services, digital and otherwise, are ubiquitous; they are indispensable part of the fabric
of our modern societies.
In addition, with the development of Web 2.0 technology, a huge amount of infor-
mation about services has become available on the Internet. On many websites people
can discuss which restaurant serves the best Chinese food; in a Business-to-Consumer
e-commerce website like Amazon.com1, people look for an online shopping (retail) ser-
vice which provides them with products; in a blog, an author posts an article about the
experience of visiting a doctor. On first approximation, the information about services
can be categorized into two types: provider-driven information and consumer-driven
information. Provider-driven information aims at propagating a service; the provider
wants customers. A typical example of provider-driven information is advertisement.
For instance, a service provider creates the official website for a service and sends an ad-
vertisement via e-mail. In an advertisement, usually the promised features and quality
of a service are introduced. Consumer-driven information, on the other hand, refers to
information such as reviews, articles, assessments, and discussions generated by service
consumers. One typical type of consumer-driven information is a review. For exam-
ple, on e-commerce websites like eBay.com and Amazon.com, one can submit a review
1Amazon.com, www.amazon.com, is an e-commerce platform, where users buy products or services
from a vendor over the Internet.
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including a rating (positive or negative) after buying a product provided by an online
retail service.
The abundance of services and the overload of service information online, result in
two main problems. The first problem is service selection. There were more than two
million third-party sellers and 188 million active customers of Amazon in 2012; more
than 100 million active users on eBay in 2011; more than one million hotels and motels
worldwide in TripAdvisor.com1. The service space is so large that people find it difficult
to choose the best service. If you plan to travel New York City in the following week and
there are over 400 hotels in the city, which hotel should you choose? The second problem
is the overload of consumer-driven information. One cannot read all the reviews in order
to compare the services. For instance, usually there are over one hundred hotels in a big
city. Each hotel has between tens and thousands of reviews in one reviewing website.
Additionally, there is more than one source providing information for the same service.
People find the information about the same service in different websites. All this adds
up to (yet another case of) information overload. But since we vitally depend on the
use of services, and since we do not want to select them randomly, the question is clear.
How can we structure the vast amount of service-related information effectively and to
our benefit?
The key approach we want to introduce and analyze in this thesis is the concept of
trust. It has been studied and investigated in many branches of science such as, but not
limited to, sociology, philosophy, psychology, economics, political science, management,
and computer science (1, 2, 4). The computational concept of trust is defined as a
subjective probability (4), which makes a prediction of the occurrence of an event such
as a good service provisioning. Moreover, trust is not just a probability estimate,
but it assigns different weights to different pieces of consumer-driven information. In
classic statistics, all information pertaining to the phenomenon under consideration
(e.g. observations, evidences and experiences) are treated with the same likelihood. In
our context, however, we need to consider the notion of relevance, too. For instance, for
computing a trust value of a hotel service, a review posted five years ago is considered
less important than a review posted recently. The quality of a hotel may change over
time. This phenomenon is called dynamics of service quality. The main advantage of
using computational trust is that, the huge collection of consumer-driven information
is mapped into a numerical value or vector. A single value is understandable since a
numerical value can indicate the quality of a service. In addition, when the service
quality is refined into attributes, for each attribute of service quality, one numerical
value is calculated as a trust measurement. If there are n attributes of a service, the
trust of the service corresponds to an n dimensional vector. Hence, by computing the
trust value or vector of a service from a large amount of consumer-driven information,
the comparison of services is transformed into the comparison of numbers or vectors.
The large amount of information for a service is compressed into a single piece of
information.
Software used for building and managing trust data related to service offerings, is
called Trust Management System (TMS). TMS refers to any combination of information
1TripAdvisor.com, www.tripadvisor.com, is a review website, where users can give ratings and
reviews of travel-related services such as hotels, flights, restaurants, etc.
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technology and activities that support trust building, managing and decision making.
The most significant component of a TMS is a trust model. A trust model is the
computing kernel of a TMS that calculates the trust value of a service. There are many
different trust models that have been proposed since 1997 (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50). They differ in aspects such
as application context, information representation, properties of trust evaluation and
robustness of the system. For instance, EigenTrust (10) applies transitive relation of
trust to a Peer-to-Peer file sharing application; PeerTrust (22) gives more weight to
transactions with a higher price. Yet there is no survey that analyzes and compares
different trust models regarding the trust in services. More importantly, a meta-model
of trust models is necessary to generalize and summarize all the proposed trust models.
Another significant issue regarding trust management for services is the robustness
of a TMS. Robustness of a TMS refers to the ability of a TMS to cope with inaccuracy
(deliberate or accidental) in the consumer-provided information used for computing
trust. The robustness issue is even more urgent than the design of a trust model, since
as a special type of Information System, a TMS is useless when it delivers inaccurate
results. There are two main reasons causing evaluation inaccuracy: data sparsity and
attack. Data sparsity refers to the state of a TMS where there is not enough data for
evaluating trust. There are only a few works that consider data sparsity (4, 18). The
second reason for evaluation inaccuracy is the possibility of compromising a TMS by
feeding it fraudulent information (51, 52). Such attacks can be classified as purposeless
attack (system destruction) and purposeful attack (manipulation). The difference be-
tween the two types of attack is whether the intention of the attack is explicit or not.
System destruction is extremely difficult to identify since so far, there has been no ex-
plicit intention to develop an identification mechanism. Regarding manipulation, there
are two types of counter-approaches: intrinsic robustness enhancement and extrinsic
robustness enhancement. Intrinsic robustness enhancement refers to a trust model hav-
ing a robustness enhancement feature to mitigate negative influences from attempted
manipulation. Extrinsic robustness enhancement refers to mechanisms which are not
part of a trust model but an important component of a TMS aiming at eliminating or
identifying manipulation.
1.2 Contributions
In this section we list the main contributions of the thesis to trust evaluation and
management as follows.
• We give a definition of trust in service-oriented systems. In our work, trust
is a computational concept. Trust is a special type of expected value which
predicts service quality. Meanwhile the definition of trust is not as same as
that of an expected value in classic probability theory, since a trust model assigns
different weights to different observations1. Note that in classic probability theory,
1In this work, observation, experience, evidence and rating are equivalent items, referring to a piece
of information which is used as an input for trust evaluation, and all are used interchangeably.
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an observation is called an outcome and unlike in trust evaluation all possible
outcomes in a sample space are treated equally.
• The basic idea of evaluating trust is to calculate the trust value via aggregat-
ing observations by giving different weights to different observations. In order to
create weight functions, properties of trust evaluation, such as transitivity, per-
sonal experience, recommendation, preference structure, etc., are considered as
key criteria.
• Although there is a wide variety of trust models that have been proposed since
1997 (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50), we do not know of any survey analyzing and comparing different trust
models with respect to trust in services. In the present thesis, 40 trust models are
compared from both a theoretical and a practical perspective, using criteria such
as application context, information representation, properties of trust evaluation,
and robustness of system.
• We propose a trust model framework for service provisioning. This framework
is considered a meta-model covering all existing trust models. A concrete trust
model can be derived by instantiating the meta-model. The key step of instan-
tiating the meta-model is to design weight functions. The design of a weight
function is subject to context such as the application domain and properties of
trust evaluation.
• We propose a number of confidence metrics at both system and query level to
solve the problem of data sparsity. The system level concerns the confidence
from a TMS perspective, while the query level focuses on how much confidence
an evaluator has with respect to trust evaluation of a service. By considering
both trust value and the corresponding confidence degree, one can make a better
service selection.
• We choose an Online File Storage Service (OFSS) as a case for studying trust
building and managing in the context of a quantitative service. A quantitative
service refers to a service the quality of which can be measured objectively. An
OFSS is an Internet hosting service, which is particularly designed to host user
files. One quality measure in an OFSS could be the speed of uploading a cer-
tain amount of data. We propose a trust model, R-Rep, for an OFSS. In order
to mitigate manipulation, we introduce a statistics based detection mechanism,
Baseline Sampling (BS). In addition, when social network information among
users is available, we propose Clique Identification (CI) to detect manipulative
groups.
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• One e-commerce website, Taobao.com1, and two review websites, TripAdvi-
sor.com and Dianping.com2, are chosen as case studies for trust building and
managing in the context of qualitative services. For a qualitative service there
is no general agreed-upon objective measure for service quality. Consider, for
example, the rating for a hotel, which is a natural number in the range one to
five. Different people give different ratings for the same hotel based on their
preferences. For each case, we propose trust models which consider intrinsic
robustness enhancement by designing special weight functions. Meanwhile, ma-
chine learning-based extrinsic robustness enhancement is applied. Three types of
machine learning approaches, clustering, classification and Annotation-Auxiliary
Clustering (AAClust), are applied to identify manipulative behavior.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces the background of trust building and managing for service
provisioning. In this chapter different definitions of trust are introduced. Regarding
trust evaluation, properties of trust evaluation are introduced such as transitivity and
evaluation confidence. 40 trust models are compared from both theoretical and practical
perspectives using the criteria such as application context, information representation,
properties of trust evaluation and robustness of system. The state-of-the-art regarding
extrinsic robust enhancement is described.
Chapter 3 provides the definition of trust evaluation on service provisioning. Both
a trust model framework and confidence evaluation metrics are proposed. All the
trust models can be generated by instantiating the framework and implementing the
corresponding evaluation metrics.
Chapter 4 introduces a case study on trust building and managing for a quantitative
service, an Online File Storage Service (OFSS). The corresponding trust models are
proposed. Considering statistical differences between honest and dishonest users, a
manipulation detection method, Baseline Sampling (BS) is proposed. In addition, when
social network information among users is available, we provide Clique Identification
(CI) to detect the manipulative group. The design of a simulation testbed and the
simulation results are given.
Chapter 5 introduces three case studies for trust building and managing for quali-
tative services. The first case study is a Chinese e-commerce website, Taobao.com. In
order to mitigate manipulation, both intrinsic and extrinsic robustness enhancement
techniques are applied. Intrinsic robustness enhancement is applied, where advanced
trust models are instantiated from the trust model framework by considering basic as-
sumptions about the suspects behavior. Extrinsic robustness enhancement, namely a
manipulation detection system, Clustering-based Suspect Identification (CSI), is pro-
posed to detect customers who provide manipulative ratings, and vendors who intend
1Taobao.com, www.taobao.com, is the biggest e-commerce platform in China.
2Dianping.com, www.dianping.com, is a Chinese reviewing website, where users give ratings and
reviews of lifestyle-related services such as restaurants, shops, lawyers, doctors, home services, etc.
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to manipulate their reputation value. After identifying the suspects (suspicious ven-
dors and suspicious customers), we explore characteristics of suspects intensively by
comparing statistics of the whole population to the suspicious sub-population.
The second case study is of a travel review website, TripAdvisor.com, where the
travel-related services such as hotels and flights are reviewed. In order to mitigate ma-
nipulation, both intrinsic and extrinsic robustness enhancement techniques are applied.
We consider the manipulation at three different levels, the review level, the reviewer
level and the service level. Regarding extrinsic robustness enhancement, both a su-
pervised learning approach, Support Vector Machines (SVMs), and an unsupervised
learning approach, Suspicion Degree Meter (SDM), are applied. SDM assigns a real
number to every object at each level. Regarding intrinsic robustness enhancement,
time-window-based, time-decay-based and suspicion-index-based trust models are pro-
posed to enhance the robustness of TMSs. After identifying suspects, the statistical
character of the suspicious sub-population and innocent sub-population are compared.
The third case study is a review website, Dianping.com, where a variety of lifestyle-
related services such as restaurants and home services are reviewed. We propose an
advanced clustering approach, Annotation-Auxiliary Clustering (AAClust), to identify
reviewers suspected of manipulation. In order to base the identification of manipulative
behavior on broader knowledge, we explore social network information for innocent and
suspicious reviewers.
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and perspective for the problems that we have
addressed. We propose a general solution to remaining problems.
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2Background
2.1 Diversity of Trust Definition
The concept of trust has been studied and investigated in many branches of science such
as, but not limited to, sociology, philosophy, psychology, economics, political science,
management, computer science. (1, 2, 4)
In order to answer the basic but unsettled question of what the word “trust” means,
Mcknight and Chervany investigate sixty research articles or books mainly about man-
agement, sociology, economics, political science and psychology (1). The phenomenon
that, “researchers are still far from a consensus on what trust means”, is called con-
ceptual confusion (1). The authors argue that,“narrow definitions of trust do not
accurately depict the concept’s rich set of meaning”. In order to make a systematic
comparison, the authors define categories of trust construct types and perceived at-
tributes of the trusted party, and observe to which specified labels a certain article
or book corresponds. Mcknight and Chervany find that trust is most often defined in
terms of expectations or beliefs. A large number of definitions refer to trust as be-
havior. The most frequently mentioned attributes are benevolence, competence, good
intentions and honesty. In addition, the paper proposes two kinds of trust typologies:
a) a classification system for types of trust, and
b) definitions of six related trust types that form a model which is shown in Fig. 2.1.
The authors argue that“Trusting Behavior is the extent to which one person volun-
tarily depends on another person in a specific situation with a feeling of relative security,
even though negative consequences are possible. Depends is a behavioral term, which
distinguishes Trusting Behavior from Trusting Intention (willingness to depend)”. And
“Trust Intention is based on the person’s confidence in beliefs about the other person”.
Stephen Marsh’s work (2) is the first PhD thesis which formalizes trust as a com-
putational concept. Instead of discovering cross-disciplinary trust building blocks,
Stephen’s main contribution is to create a computational trust model which can be
7
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Figure 2.1: Relationships among trust constructs (1)
implemented in the domain of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In every part of the the-
sis, the trace of trust-definition diversity can be sensed. Stephen states that, “trust
is a judgement of unquestionable utility”. However, trust can be categorized as hope,
despair, confidence, innocence and impulsiveness as well (53, 54). Deutsch (55) states
that,
a) an individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that can lead to an
event perceived to be beneficial or to an event perceived to be harmful;
b) he perceives that the occurrence of these events is contingent on the behavior of
another person; and
c) he perceives the strength of a harmful event to be greater than the strength of a
beneficial event. If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties, he
makes a trusting choice; else he makes a distrustful choice.
Luhmann’s main thesis (56) is that trust is a means for reducing the complexity of
society. He considers it as a “basic fact of human life”. Interestingly, trust is not only
a basic fact of human life, but also is that of animal life. Harcourt shows that, when
vampire bats have had a good night and a surplus of blood, they feed those who have
not. They cooperate in this way such that they can be fed when they don’t get enough
blood on another night (57). In Stephen’s model, a number of concepts are formalized,
such as agent, situation, knowledge, basic trust, general trust in agents, situational trust
in agents, utility, importance of a situation and time. There is a positive threshold and
a negative one specifying the bottom line for “trusted” and “distrusted” respectively,
which is illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
Audun Jøsang’s survey (4) contains a large volume of information regarding Trust
and Reputation Systems for online service provision. Jøsang provides two versions of
trust definition: reliability trust and decision trust. Reliability trust is defined as “the
subjective probability by which an individual, A, expects that another individual, B,
performs a given action on which its welfare depends”. The definition of decision trust
is the same as that of Trusting Behavior (1). In fact, the two definitions are nothing
but a re-iteration of Gambetta’s definition (58) and Trusting Behavior (1). The main
8
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c) Asymmetry. This property states that “A trusts B” does not imply that B trusts A.
If trust relations were symmetry, the trust of B in A could be derived from the trust
of A in B and vice versa. On the contrary, asymmetry is not very useful property
in terms of computation.
d) Personal experience. If a consumer used a service before, personal experience is
taken into account for evaluating trust.
e) Recommendation. Second-hand information such as recommendation is indispens-
able when there is no or not enough personal experience. The usage of recommen-
dation appears very often when online service provisioning takes place (4). Most
trust models can handle this problem. In particular, Recommender Systems (18, 27)
provide typical solutions for a user to find recommendations from previous users.
Note that in comparison to recommendation (second-hand information), personal
experience should be given more weight (18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26).
f) Experience context. Whether an experience is second-hand or not, the context of
an experience is significant as well (8, 19, 22, 28). A typical example is the size of
a transaction which can be represented by the monetary cost (28).
g) Preference structure. Different trusters evaluate trust of the same trustee differently
since they might have had different personal experience (22, 25, 26, 27). Even though
there is no personal experience with the trustee, different trusters might end up with
different values of trust due to different personal tastes. The preference structure is
rendered to characterize the trusters’ differences. Furthermore considering trust is
a multi-dimension notion, one can come up with a weighted sum to derive a single
trust value from the corresponding trust vector, in which each entry represents the
trust in a certain dimension. The setting of weights given to different dimensions is
different from truster to truster and this fact is also captured by preference structure.
h) Dynamics of service provisioning quality. Most trust models consider older experi-
ences less relevant than recent ones (15, 19, 21, 22, 23), because the quality of service
provisioning may vary over time. Trust measures should capture the dynamics by
creating an appropriate weight function.
i) Evaluation confidence. This is a measure for the “quality” of evaluation used as
a basis for computing a trust value or a trust vector (19, 24, 25, 27, 31). Such a
measure is important because in practice many trust and reputation systems suffer
from the problem of data sparsity (4, 18). This reflects that fact that in many
situations one has only a few evaluations on a small number of services from a
(potentially) large inventory.
j) Feedback mechanism. Feedback is a process is which information about the past or
the present influences the phenomenon under consideration in the present or future.
Considering a trust model as a key component of a Trust Management System
(TMS), the feedback mechanism (21, 30, 32) is a candidate to evaluate the accuracy
of a trust model and resist manipulation (4, 51). This will be discussed in more
detail later in the thesis.
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2.3 Related Trust Models
A trust model, i.e. a computational model for evaluating trust, plays a key role in
Trust Management Systems (TMSs). Variety large number of trust models has been
proposed since 1997. We select 40 trust models (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38) that
from our perspective covers the whole spectrum and categorize them according to their
scope and the techniques applied. In addition, a number of web sites, such as Ebay.com,
Amazon.com, TripAdvisor.com, etc., integrate trust management into their systems in
order to provide an indicator for service selection. In this section the 40 trust models
are compared from both theoretical and practical perspectives using the criteria such
as application context, information representation, properties of trust evaluation and
robustness of system.
2.3.1 Comparison of Trust Models with respect to Application Con-
text
Different trust models have been proposed for different application types. This is an
important criterion which has usually been overlooked in previous work. Most trust
models are derived from a specific application domain such as file sharing in the P2P
communities, or e-commerce, or web services, etc. Trust is introduced into the domain
to solve a specific problem such as agents’ cooperation (2, 26), software components
selection (37), movie or product recommendation (18, 27), etc. But as a matter of fact,
trust is application-context sensitive, because an application domain endows trust with
semantics and properties. In other words, trust is instantiated within an application
domain. Afterwards, trust can be defined and the corresponding trust model can be
created.
Table 2.1 shows the comparison results. We distinguish 10 different application
domains. The most important result we can see from Table 2.1 is that, almost all the
trust models correspond to the domain of either Multi-Agent System & P2P community
or e-commerce. The definition of trust models for those two domains is not surprising
because they cover a large portion of the service provisioning space. Note that one trust
model can cover more than one domain if it is properly designed. Some trust models
are designed to be application independent, but some are designed for a specific domain
such as file sharing (10, 14) and SaaS (37). The recommender model (18, 27, 32) is
considered a specific paradigm for modeling trust. Its typical application domains are
e-commerce and movie/music recommendations. There are two special domains in this
table: travel and living. The former refers to the services related to travel arrangements
such as accommodation, transportation, catering, etc. The latter refers to the services
related to daily life such as food, drink, shopping, home services, health and medical
services, etc. The two domains are special since unlike normal e-commerce application
such as online shopping, currently payment of travel or living related service is carried
on in reality. After payment and consumption of the service, users provide a rating
or a review to the TMS. In addition, the ratings for travel-related and living-related
11
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services are highly subjective. Features such as oﬄine payment and rating subjectivity
increase difficulty of trust model design.
2.3.2 Comparison of Trust Models with respect to Information Rep-
resentation
Before designing a trust model one has to specify what types of information the system
is dealing with. One type of input information for the TMS consists of observations (also
called experiences, ratings or reviews). A basic approach towards trust evaluation is to
aggregate observations by giving different observations different weights depending on
the character of observations. For instance, new observations should be given a higher
weight than old observations. The choice of computational model is largely dependent
on the character of observations. There are at least two questions one has to ask:
a) Is the observation discrete or continuous?
b) Is the measure subjective or objective? In some cases, an observation is objective,
for instance if agent A downloads a file which contains virus from agent B, the
system will collect a negative observation of B’s service provisioning behavior (10).
However, in other cases, an observation will be subjective (18, 22, 27, 30, 32), as is
typically the case for rating systems.
In addition, the outcome of the system is either a single value or a vector which
measures the quantity(ies) of trust. There are two types of trust structure. In a
simple trust structure, trust is measured along just one dimension. A classic example is
EigenTrust (10). Most trust models follow the simple trust structure. A complex trust
structure models trust as a multi-dimensional concept. In a complex trust structure,
service quality is decomposed into different dimensions (attributes) in order to refine
the definition of trust. A complex trust model doesn’t necessarily lead to representing
trust as a vector (19, 30), because a single value of trust can be finally calculated by
using weighted sum (31, 37) or partial order (29). Table 2.2 shows the comparison
results.
2.3.3 Comparison of Trust Models with respect to Properties of Trust
Evaluation
In section 2.2 we introduced the important properties of trust evaluation. Here we
compare different trust models w.r.t. the criterion of trust evaluation properties; this
is shown in Table 2.3. There are several abbreviations and special symbols that we
need to define. The symbol “#” after a property name expresses that this property is
essential to evaluate trust for service provisioning. For instance, unlike recommender
systems (18, 27, 32) which work in the domain of online shopping and movie recom-
mendation, service quality could vary over time. Therefore, the property of dynamics
of quality is followed by a “#”. Most of the properties are introduced in section 2.2.
The properties of attack resistance and machine learning are not mentioned in section
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BizRate *
Ebay *
Amazon *
Epinions *
Yelp *
TripAdvisor *
Advogato *
CBFiltering 1997 (33) * *
CFiltering 1999 (27) * *
Yu 2000 (6) *
Abdul-Rahman 2000 (38) *
Manchala 2000 (7) *
Jøsang 2001 (8) * *
Chen 2001 (31) * *
Aberer 2001 (34) *
Sarwar 2001 (18) *
REGRET 2001 (19) * *
Yu 2002 (20) *
Yu 2003 (9) *
Richardson 2003 (5) *
Wang 2003 (30) *
EigenTrust 2003 (10) * *
Buchegger 2004 (21) * *
PeerTrust 2004 (22) * *
Guha 2004 (11) *
FuzzyTrust 2005 (28) * *
TrustGuard 2005 (23) *
Maximilien 2005 (29) * *
TRAVOS 2006 (24) *
Wang 2006 & 2007 (12, 13) *
PowerTrust 2007 (14) * *
Quercia 2007 (15) *
YZhang 2007 (36) *
Resnick 2007 (32) *
JZhang 2008 (25) * *
Liu 2008 (16) *
Limam 2010 (37) *
Noorian 2011 (26) * *
Duan 2012a (59) *
Duan 2012c (68) *
Table 2.1: Trust models comparison with respect to application context
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Binary/Discrete/Contin-
uous Observation
Objective/Subjective
Observation
Simple/Complex
Trust Structure
BizRate D O S
Ebay D O S
Amazon D O S
Epinions B S S
Yelp D S S
TripAdvisor D S S
Advogato D S S
CBFiltering 1997 (33) D S S
CFiltering 1999 (27) D S S
Yu 2000 (6) C O/S S
Abdul-Rahman 2000 (38) D S S
Manchala 2000 (7) B O S
Jøsang 2001 (8) B O/S S
Chen 2001 (31) D S C
Aberer 2001 (34) B O S
Sarwar 2001 (18) D S S
REGRET 2001 (19) C S C
Yu 2002 (20) B O/S S
Yu 2003 (9) D O/S S
Richardson 2003 (5) C S S
Wang 2003 (30) B S C
EigenTrust 2003 (10) B O S
Buchegger 2004 (21) B O S
PeerTrust 2004 (22) C S S
Guha 2004 (11) C O/S S
FuzzyTrust 2005 (28) C O S
TrustGuard 2005 (23) C O/S S
Maximilien 2005 (29) B/D/C O/S C
TRAVOS 2006 (24) B O S
Wang 2006 & 2007 (12, 13) B O/S S
PowerTrust 2007 (14) B O S
Quercia 2007 (15) D S S
YZhang 2007 (36) D O S
Resnick 2007 (32) D S S
JZhang 2008 (25) B S S
Liu 2008 (16) B S S
Limam 2010 (37) C O C
Noorian 2011 (26) B S S
Duan 2012a (59) B S S
Duan 2012c (68) D S S
Table 2.2: Trust models comparison with respect to formulation
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2.2, since they are not strongly related to trust evaluation per se. A trust model with
the innate feature of attack resistance is superior to the one without it, because TMSs
are vulnerable to attack. Machine learning, focusing on prediction based on known
properties learned from the training data, has been developed for purposes other than
trust modeling. But there are two interesting models (15, 16) using machine learning
technology to predict a trust value. Furthermore, we develop some properties such
as personal experience first. Personal experience first means considering both personal
(first) experience and recommendation, the former should always be given more weights
than the latter. The symbol “*” represents that the trust model in that row has the
property corresponding to that column. The symbol “D” represents that whether the
model has the corresponding property depends on the parameters specified in the trust
model. For instance, whether REGRET (19) has the property of personal experience
first depends on the weights given to personal experience and recommendation (second-
hand experience).
Table 2.3 shows us the results of trust models comparison w.r.t. properties. Almost
all of the models have the property of personal experience first or the property of
recommendation. Some trust models have both of them. It is obvious to have either of
the two properties or both because trust value should be derived from either first-hand
or second-hand information or both. Exceptionally, there are two models (29, 37) which
have neither of them. The two models assume existence of a strong system trust (1)
which monitors service quality. The system trust refers to “the extent to which one
believes that proper impersonal structures are in place to enable one to anticipate a
successful future endeavor” (1). Service consumers do not need to provide observations
in this case. Instead, system collects the corresponding evidence. Different trust models
treat the property of personal experience first differently. On the one hand, from the
service selection perspective, the property of personal experience first is practically not
very useful since in most cases a user queries the system when he has no information
about a certain service or the information is out of date. On the other hand, the
property of personal experience first is indispensable for multi-agent cooperation (2). In
particular, REGRET (19) has an uncertain state on the property of personal experience
first. Since it uses a weighted sum to combine first-hand and second-hand information.
When the weight given to first-hand information is larger than 0.5, this model has the
property; otherwise, it does not have it.
Furthermore, the property of evaluation confidence is very important for trust eval-
uation on service provisioning due to data sparsity (4, 18), yet only a few models
(19, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32) contain the property. Whether transitivity of trust is applicable
depends on features of application domain and semantic constraints (17). Whether
the property of preference structure is applicable depends on features of application
domain as well. The properties of transaction context and dynamics of quality are the
least often considered, furthermore only a few models (7, 19, 22, 23, 28, 37) have both
of them.
In particular, many models have drawn attention to the robustness of TMSs since it
is such a serious issue (7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 32, 36, 59). All of the models
that include robustness intend to mitigate negative influence of attacks by enhancing
the robustness of trust models per se. We call it intrinsic robustness enhancement. A
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feedback mechanism refers to the mechanism that TMSs compare the difference between
two numbers. The first number is a value of trust evaluation for a service. The second
one is the numerical rating given by an evaluator after service consumption. It is widely
used for recommender systems to evaluate accuracy of prediction or recommendation
(18, 27, 32).
2.3.4 Comparison of Trust Models with respect to Robustness of Sys-
tem
Robustness of a TMS is the ability of a TMS to cope with inaccuracy during trust
evaluation. There are two main reasons causing evaluation inaccuracy: data sparsity
and attack. Data sparsity refers to the state of a TMS where there is not enough data
for evaluating trust. If there is no data available on a service, one cannot compute a
trust value. Item-based collaborative filtering (18), which regards the trust value of an
analogous service as the result, is an exception to this case. However the validity of
the item-based collaborative filtering is evaluated only in the movie recommendation
domain. The problem of data sparsity usually only occurs at the very beginning of a
TMS’ life cycle. It is also known as the cold-start problem. The second reason for eval-
uation inaccuracy is attack on TMSs (51, 52). This refers to any attempt at influencing
or controlling the evaluation of trust. Attack can be classified as purposeless attack
(system destruction) and purposeful attack (manipulation). The difference between the
two types of attack is whether the intention of attack is explicit or not. Almost all the
attacks are purposeful (51, 52). There are five main types of manipulation: promoting,
slandering, dynamic character, white-washing and orchestration.
a) Promoting: attackers provide fraudulent positive observations or ratings to promote
the trust value of a service.
b) Slandering: attackers provide fraudulent negative observations or ratings to demote
the trust value of a service.
c) Dynamic personality (22): attackers can build trust and then start cheating (pro-
moting/slandering) or oscillating between building and losing the trust.
d) White-washing (51): attackers abuse the system for short-term gains by letting their
trust degrade and then reentering the system with a new identity with fresh trust.
e) Orchestration (51): colluders follow a multi-faceted, coordinated attack. These
attacks utilize multiple strategies.
From Table 2.4 we can see that most of the trust models suffer from the cold-start
problem, with the exception of Epinions.com and (36, 37). The cold-start problem is
solved by importing a revenue based incentive mechanism (4), allowing credit transfer
between users in the same social group (36) or importing system trust (1) to guarantee
data sufficiency (37).
In addition, regarding the white-washing problem, the trust models in yelp.com
and tripadvisor.com are immune to white-washing since they verify identities of service
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Structure #
Personal
Experience First
Recomm-
endation #
Experience
Context #
Dynamics
of Quality #
Evaluation
Confidence #
Attack
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Mechanism #
Machine
Learning
BizRate *
Ebay *
Amazon *
Epinions * *
Yelp *
TripAdvisor *
Advogato * * *
CBFiltering 1997 (33) *
CFiltering 1999 (27) * * *
Yu 2000 (6) *
Abdul-Rahman 2000 (38) *
Manchala 2000 (7) *
Jøsang 2001 (8) * *
Chen 2001 (31) * *
Aberer 2001 (34) *
Sarwar 2001 (18) * *
REGRET 2001 (19) * D * * * *
Yu 2002 (20) *
Yu 2003 (9) * * *
Richardson 2003 (5) * *
Wang 2003 (30) * * *
EigenTrust 2003 (10) * * *
Buchegger 2004 (21) * * * * *
PeerTrust 2004 (22) * * * * * *
Guha 2004 (11) * *
FuzzyTrust 2005 (28) * * *
TrustGuard 2005 (23) * * * * * *
Maximilien 2005 (29) *
TRAVOS 2006 (24) * * *
Wang 2006 & 2007 (12, 13) * *
PowerTrust 2007 (14) * * *
Quercia 2007 (15) * * * *
YZhang 2007 (36) *
Resnick 2007 (32) * * * *
JZhang 2008 (25) * * * * * *
Liu 2008 (16) * * *
Limam 2010 (37) * * *
Noorian 2011 (26) * * * * *
Duan 2012a (59) * * *
Duan 2012c (68) * * * *
Table 2.3: Trust models comparison with respect to properties
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providers. The recommendation models (18, 27, 33) are immune as well because ser-
vice providers cannot easily change their identities. Noura Limam’s trust model (37)
solves the white-washing problem by using system trust (1). Zhang’s trust model (36)
proposes methods such as CAPTCHA and assigns the lowest trust to new comers to
cope with the white-washing problem.
There are two methods that can be employed to restrict the effect of dynamic
personality. One is to use a time window or time decay factor (7, 10, 15, 19, 21, 23,
25, 28, 36), because this reduces the time interval in which attackers can play with
a TMS. The other is to consider the transaction context (22, 28) such as size of the
transaction when evaluating trust. This method prevents one from cheating in a large
transaction right after building the trust by succeeding in having made a number of
small transactions.
The problem of orchestration is so complicated that only a few models, including the
website Advogato, manage to cope with it by assuming the strategies of orchestration
(9, 14, 22, 23, 36), using a feedback mechanism (32) or pre-trust (7, 10, 37). By assum-
ing the strategies of orchestration, one can capture the character of orchestration and
propose efficient detection algorithms. Feedback mechanism is a good solution against
orchestration since we can always compare the real experiences to the contaminative
trust value and decide whether a system is under attack or not. Pre-trust assumes the
whole set or some subset of observations, which is used for trust evaluation, is free of
orchestration. Then we can derive the genuine trust value based on the trustworthy
data.
In order to detect and counter purposeful attacks, there are seven main strategies
being used by the trust models which are shown in Table 2.5.
a) Statistics. Some trust models filter out fraudulent observations or ratings by assum-
ing that the majority of observations are genuine (6, 9, 20, 36). The basic idea is to
override the effect of fraudulent ratings by considering a large number of users who
offer honest ratings.
b) Pre-trust. It is defined that some peers (7, 10) or the trust evaluation infrastructure
(37) are trustworthy. The robustness of a TMS is built on this base. The website
Advogato uses a method similar to EigenTrust (10).
c) Security mechanism. The common security mechanisms used for enhancing robust-
ness are: verification (7), CAPTCHA (36) and encryption/decryption (36). In the
domain of e-commerce, verification is used to check a customer’s authentication cre-
dentials. Verification and CAPTCHA can increase the cost of changing a new iden-
tity in a TMS. Moreover, classical security technology like encryption/decryption
can be used to prevent attackers from intercepting the data of a TMS in a distributed
computing environment.
d) Feedback mechanism. At certain point of time a user A asks a TMS to what degree
a service can be trusted. The TMS computes a score T for the request. After using
the service, the user A will submit his/her own rating T’ for the service. Then
the system can compare the difference between T and T’ in order to evaluate the
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accuracy of the trust evaluation. There are two models (21, 32) using this mechanism
to resist manipulation.
e) Manipulative behavior assumption. PeerTrust (22) and TrustGuard (23) follow the
assumption that peers in a collusive group give good ratings within the group and
bad ratings outside the group. A collusive group refers to a set of users who agree
to behave collaboratively in order to make a profit from a TMS. The trust model
(34) gives a typical malicious behavior pattern and defines the corresponding metrics
based on this pattern. TRAVOS (24) assumes that the trust value of a trustee won’t
change over time.
f) Personal experience. Trust models (21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32) evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of the second-hand information and the corresponding referral by comparing
personal experience to the second-hand information. It is obvious that you trust
the referrals more, if their observations are more similar to yours. However it may
not always work since you may have no experience on the service or your experience
has already been out of date.
g) Abuse report. Websites such as Amazon.com, Yelp.com and TripAdvisor.com allow
users to submit a message to report the suspiciousness of a rating.
2.4 Robustness Enhancement Mechanism
In subsection 2.3.4 we introduced the main techniques of intrinsic robustness enhance-
ment, such as pre-trust, feedback mechanism and personal experience. However, the
way of enhancing trust model per se is not enough to fight against manipulation (60, 61).
Some external approaches, so called extrinsic robustness enhancement, must be adopted
to detect and to filter out manipulative behavior.
During the study, we find 13 relevant works including ours which manage to detect
attacks in TMSs. At first we compare the works w.r.t. application domains. None of
them are proposed in the P2P or MAS domain (see Table 2.6). Instead, all of them focus
on e-commerce, travel-related services or living-related services. It is not a coincidence
that most of them focus on e-commerce, since a large number of manipulative behaviors
have already been uncovered in this domain (59, 62, 63, 64, 65). In addition to e-
commerce websites like Amazon.com and Taobao.com which suffer from manipulation,
many review websites in which different types of service are discussed and reviewed, such
as TripAdvisor.com, Yelp.com, Dianping.com, etc., are struggling against manipulation
as well (66, 67, 68, 69). We can see from Table 2.6 that manipulation on TMSs exists
universally online.
Regarding the methodology used for manipulation detection, all of the enhancement
approaches are compared in Table 2.7. There are four types of approaches, which
are statistical filtering, clustering, classification and semi-unsupervised learning. The
first approach is called statistical filtering. This type of approach assumes that unfair
ratings can be recognized by their statistical properties. The previous work (70, 71, 72)
intends to build such a statistical model to filter out unfair or fraudulent ratings. For
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BizRate * * * * * *
Ebay * * * * * *
Amazon * * * * * *
Epinions * * * * *
Yelp * * * * *
TripAdvisor * * * * *
Advogato * *
CBFiltering 1997 (33) * * * *
CFiltering 1999 (27) * * * *
Yu 2000 (6) * * * * * *
Abdul-Rahman 2000 (38) * * * * * *
Manchala 2000 (7) * *
Jøsang 2001 (8) * * * * * *
Chen 2001 (31) * * * * * *
Aberer 2001 (34) * * * * *
Sarwar 2001 (18) * * * *
REGRET 2001 (19) * * * * *
Yu 2002 (20) * * * * * *
Yu 2003 (9) * * *
Richardson 2003 (5) * * * * * *
Wang 2003 (30) * * * * * *
EigenTrust 2003 (10) * *
Buchegger 2004 (21) * * *
PeerTrust 2004 (22) * *
Guha 2004 (11) * * * * * *
FuzzyTrust 2005 (28) * * * * *
TrustGuard 2005 (23) * *
Maximilien 2005 (29) * * * * * *
TRAVOS 2006 (24) * * * * * *
Wang 2006 & 2007 (12, 13) * * * * * *
PowerTrust 2007 (14) * * *
Quercia 2007 (15) * * * * *
YZhang 2007 (36) *
Resnick 2007 (32) * *
JZhang 2008 (25) * * *
Liu 2008 (16) * * * * *
Limam 2010 (37)
Noorian 2011 (26) * * * *
Table 2.4: Trust models comparison with respect to robustness against attacks
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BizRate
Ebay
Amazon *
Epinions
Yelp *
TripAdvisor *
Advogato *
CBFiltering 1997 (33)
CFiltering 1999 (27)
Yu 2000 (6) *
Abdul-Rahman 2000 (38)
Manchala 2000 (7) * *
Jøsang 2001 (8)
Chen 2001 (31)
Aberer 2001 (34) *
Sarwar 2001 (18)
REGRET 2001 (19)
Yu 2002 (20) *
Yu 2003 (9) *
Richardson 2003 (5)
Wang 2003 (30)
EigenTrust 2003 (10) *
Buchegger 2004 (21) * *
PeerTrust 2004 (22) * *
Guha 2004 (11)
FuzzyTrust 2005 (28)
TrustGuard 2005 (23) * *
Maximilien 2005 (29)
TRAVOS 2006 (24) * *
Wang 2006 & 2007 (12, 13)
PowerTrust 2007 (14) *
Quercia 2007 (15)
YZhang 2007 (36) * *
Resnick 2007 (32) * *
JZhang 2008 (25) *
Liu 2008 (16)
Limam 2010 (37) *
Noorian 2011 (26) *
Table 2.5: Trust models comparison with respect to strategies against manipulation
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Travel E-Commerce Living
Dellarocas 2000 (70) *
Whitby 2005 (71) *
Jindal 2008 (62) *
O’Mahony 2010 (75) *
Wu 2010 (66) *
Lim 2010 (63) *
Duan 2011 (72) *
Ott 2011 (67) *
Mukherjee 2012 (64) *
Duan 2012a (59) *
Duan 2012b (65) *
Duan 2012c (68) *
Duan 2013 *
Table 2.6: Robustness enhancement mechanisms comparison with respect to application
domain
instance, unfair positive ratings are detected by using clustering the target ratings and
they assume that unfair positive ratings exist then the cluster with higher ratings is
the unfair group; the unfair negative ratings have been avoided by using controlled
anonymity mechanism (70). Alternatively the observed ratings which stay outside of
the confidence interval are considered to be unfair (71).
The other three approaches can be generally called machine-learning-based ap-
proaches. Theoretically there are four types of machine-learning-based approaches
which can be applied for this task: clustering, classification, semi-supervised learn-
ing (73) and semi-unsupervised learning (74). From the-state-of-the-art we know that
semi-supervised learning has not been applied to the topic of manipulation detection,
therefore we list only three types in Table 2.7 except semi-supervised learning. Most
of the work (62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 75) use classification, however the quality of human
annotations can be a weak point for a classification-based approach (67). We argue
that, unless one has a set of high-quality training data, clustering or semi-unsupervised
learning is a better choice.
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Statistical
Filtering
Clustering Classification Semi-unsupervised
Dellarocas 2000 *
Whitby 2004 *
Jindal 2008 *
O’Mahony 2010 *
Wu 2010 *
Lim 2010 *
Duan 2011 *
Ott 2011 *
Mukherjee 2012 *
Duan 2012a (59) *
Duan 2012c (68) *
Duan 2012c *
Duan 2013 *
Table 2.7: Robustness enhancement mechanisms comparison with respect to methodology
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3Trust in Service Provisioning
In this chapter we propose a framework for calculating trust in service provisioning and
introduce how to evaluate trust in service.
3.1 A Trust Model Framework for Service Provisioning
In this section a trust framework and its building components are introduced. Next
we define metrics for evaluating confidence of trust calculation. Finally accuracy of a
TMS and feedback mechanism are discussed.
3.1.1 A Framework for Trust Evaluation
Section 2.3 presented a classification of 40 trust models (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38). But this comparison does not put the models into a consistent framework.
Such a framework (or metamodel) would, however, be very useful for systematically
analyzing the properties of existing models and chart out the characteristics of new
ones. Therefore, we propose a trust model framework for service provisioning to fill in
the blank. The essence of the framework is captured by formula 3.1.
TM(e, s) =
R(s)∑
i=1
ri ∗
∏
k
wk(evai, e, ri, s) (3.1)
TM denotes a trust model, e represents a trust evaluator, the service is denoted by
s, the rating is ri and evai denotes a referral who provides the rating ri. TM , which is
defined as a function of a trust evaluator e and the service s, is called a trust model.
The outcome of a trust model is the quantity of trust that e has in s. The key idea of
trust evaluation is to aggregate ratings (observations or experiences) after normalizing
them by weight functions wk. The design of weight functions can determine whether a
trust model is fit for purpose. For instance, if the quality of s changes over time and the
quantity of trust is an indicator of the quality, we could design a function which assigns
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more weights to the latest ratings than the old ones. In formula 3.1, e represents a
trust evaluator who could be either a service consumer in a classic e-commerce setting,
or a peer who both provides and consumes service. R(s) represents the set of ratings
assigned to service s. A trust evaluator who provides the rating ri is represented as
evai. The trust evaluator e could ever provide a rating to the service s. Therefore, evai
could be the trust evaluator e itself or other evaluators.
When people rate services, facilities etc., they do not do this completely objectively
even though they often think they do. Different people have different backgrounds and
different standards for judging their environment. In addition, some are generally more
critical (or more generous) than others. So given a scale 1 to 10, some will use all
the 10 values, others will only use 1 to, say, 7, while yet others will rate everything
between 5 and 10. In order to make those different ratings comparable, we suggest
normalizing them using the weight functions such as Pearson correlation coefficient
and cosine similarity.
The most common similarity measurements are Pearson correlation coefficient and
cosine similarity (27). The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of the linear
dependency between two variables, with a value ranging from -1 to +1. +1 indicates
strict linear dependency; 0 indicates complete independence. The instantiation of a
weight function based on a correlation coefficient is shown in formula 3.2. Letter a
and b represent two trust evaluators. CRS(a, b) represents a set of services which are
commonly rated by both a and b.
Wpcc =
∑|CRS(a,b)|
i=1 (rai − r¯a)(rbi − r¯b)√∑|CRS(a,b)|
i=1 (rai − r¯a)2
√∑|CRS(a,b)|
i=1 (rbi − r¯b)2
(3.2)
Cosine similarity is a measure of similarity between two vectors of an inner product
space that measures the cosine of the angle between the two vectors. In this case,
the set of ratings on CRS(a, b) given by either a or b is considered as a vector. The
instantiation of a weight function with respect to cosine similarity is given by formula
3.3.
Wcos =
∑|CRS(a,b)|
i=1 rai ∗ rbi√∑|CRS(a,b)|
i=1 (rai)
2
√∑|CRS(a,b)|
i=1 (rbi)
2
(3.3)
Regarding a service, dynamics of service quality is the most significant factor to
consider for trust evaluation. Dynamics of service quality means that the quality of
service could change over time. Different weight functions can be designed to implement
the idea that the older a rating, the less important the rating is. The first type of
weight function is called time window; it simply ignores all the ratings outside of a
specified time window. The width of a time window is usually determined empirically
or by assumptions (70). For instance, we can set such a time window that there are
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quantitative enough ratings within it. The weight function for a time window is given
by formula 3.4, where ti is a time stamp of a rating i.
wtw =
{
1 if ti is within the time window
0 Otherwise
(3.4)
The second type is called forgetting or discount factor (21). The corresponding
weight function for the discount factor is given by formula 3.5, where twi represents
the time window which a rating i belongs to. The whole time axis is divided into
small time windows, which are referenced by an index. The length of a time window
is application-dependent. Each rating falls into exactly one time windows. Function
idx(), whose argument is a time window twi, returns an index of a time window. The
index of a time window changes dynamically over time: The time window which the
current time belongs to, always has index 0. The next time window has index 1, and
so on. What the weight function wff does is to give 1 to the ratings in the most recent
time window, and give α to the ratings shown in the next time window, and so on. The
weight function wff gives exponentially less weight to older observations.
wff = α
idx(twi), where α ∈ (0, 1] (3.5)
Regarding a rating, transaction context is a key concern for creating the weight
function. Transaction context refers to the context with respect to a financial transac-
tion in E-commerce. For instance, price is a typical transaction context. It is obvious
that a rating for a transaction of 1000 dollars should not be weighed the same as that
for a transaction of 10 cents. However, it is difficult to propose an abstract weight
function since it is application-dependent.
Manipulation influences trustworthiness of ratings as well. Manipulation suspicion
can be considered as an extra factor for creating a weight function. Based on as-
sumptions, the statistical character of the manipulation could be learned by statistical
inference or machine learning (59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76).
After applying a manipulation detection approach, we could label each rating with a
real number which indicates to what degree this rating is suspicious in terms of ma-
nipulation. For instance, for each rating, a value between 0 and 1 is obtained directly
using fuzzy c-means (68). In fuzzy clustering, every point has a degree of belonging
to clusters, as in fuzzy logic, rather than belonging completely to just one cluster. In
this case, the outcome of a manipulation detection approach can be treated as that of
a weight function considering manipulation suspicion.
Fig. 3.1 shows a typical scenario for service provisioning and consumption. All the
objects are categorized into two classes: evaluator and services. An edge between two
points represents a rating which an evaluator gives to a service. Formally, this can
be described as a bipartite graph, where an edge connects a vertex in the evaluator
set to one in the service set. Recommender Systems and e-commerce websites can be
modelled in this way. Let us take evaluator e3 as a subject and consider how to build
weighting functions in different circumstances.
If e3 wants to calculate his trust in s2, first of all he needs to consider first-hand
information. The first-hand information refers to the ratings provided by e3. A dashed
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κ = up1p2p4 + u
p1p3
p4
− up1p2p4 up1p3p4
P1 = p1 → p2 → p4
P2 = p1 → p3 → p4
bP1
⊕
P2
p4
= (bp1p2p4 u
p1p3
p4
+ bp1p3p4 u
p1p2
p4
) / κ
dP1
⊕
P2
p4
= (dp1p2p4 u
p1p3
p4
+ dp1p3p4 u
p1p2
p4
) / κ
uP1
⊕
P2
p4
= (up1p2p4 u
p1p3
p4
) / κ
(3.7)
When normal transitive closure is applied, multiplication and minimum value are
the valid candidates of the concatenation operator (5). Addition and maximum value
are the corresponding candidates of the aggregation operator (5). In particular, Eigen-
trust (10) uses multiplication as the concatenation operator, and addition as the aggre-
gation operator. In Fig. 3.2, the trust p1 places in p4 is equal to 0.3∗1.0+0.7∗0.8 = 0.86.
The choice of implementation of the weight function results from the problem we are
dealing with. In order to decrease the number of downloads of inauthentic files in P2P
file-sharing network, it is a good design for EigenTrust to use multiplication and ad-
dition to implement the weighting function. However, it could be a bad idea to apply
the same design in other problem domains. The rationality and correctness can be
evaluated only in a specific problem domain.
The last point to consider regarding building a weight function is the type of ratings.
There are two types of them in a TMS: first-hand ratings and second-hand ratings. A
first-hand rating refers to the ratings provided by the evaluator himself. A second-hand
rating refers to the ratings provided by the other service consumers rather than the
evaluator. One popular idea is that, first-hand ratings are superior to second-hand ones
(21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26). Some trust models only consider first-hand ratings (36). A
more flexible method is to give different weights to different types of ratings depending
on the particular circumstance (19).
3.1.2 Confidence Evaluation
Researchers usually focus on the design of trust evaluation however they ignore the
issue of confidence evaluation. Confidence evaluation refers to the metrics to measure
the quality of trust evaluation. Using confidence evaluation, we can ask the questions
like how confident a trust evaluation is or whether the amount of ratings is large enough
to calculate the trust value. Although there are some models (19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31)
considering the issue of confidence evaluation, they don’t treat the issue in a systematic
way. We consider this issue at two different levels: the system level and the query
level. The system level concerns the confidence evaluation from a TMS perspective,
while the query level focuses on how much confidence an evaluator has regarding trust
evaluation of a certain service. The basic idea of integrating confidence metrics into the
framework is to provide more information for end users who want to select a service.
At each level, we propose confidence metrics for different evaluation components such
as trust inference by transitivity, rating quantity, etc.
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a) Confidence for transitivity in the query level (CTQ). At the query level, the metric
intends to calculate the ratio of connected referrals to all the referrals provided to
a rating of a service. A connection from the evaluator e to a referral means there
is an arrow from e to the referral in a trust network. For instance, in Fig. 3.2, if
we take p1 as a trust evaluator and p4 as a service provider, the trust evaluator has
two connected referrals {p2, p3}. CTQ(e, s) is defined by formula 3.8, where R(s)
represents the set of referrals who ever provided a rating or ratings to a service s.
ConRef(e,R(s)) picks up the set of referrals to whom the evaluator e connects, the
set of all the referrals is equal to R(s). In Fig. 3.2, p4 has 4 referrals which are
{p2, p3, p6, p8} and |ConRef(p1, R(p4))| = 2, so CTQ(p1, p4) = 0.5.
CTQ(e, s) =
|ConRef(e,R(s))|
|R(s)| (3.8)
b) Confidence for transitivity at the system level (CTS). We can convert a directed
graph such as the one illustrated in Fig 3.2, into a matrix representation. We create
a connection matrix Cnn, where n is the number of peers (users) involved. An entry
eij of the matrix is equal to 1 if there is at least one path from peer i to peer j,
otherwise it is equal to 0. CTS is defined by the ratio of number of connected pairs
to the number of all the possible connections. CTS indicates how many percentage
of pairs of users are connected.
CTS =
∑
i 6=j eij
n(n− 1) (3.9)
c) Confidence for rating quantity at the query level (CRQ). When a rating is a binary
value, there are two methods for evaluating confidence: certainty measurement (13)
and Chernoff bound (77). The certainty measurement considers trust as a certainty
in terms of evidence based on a statistical measure defined over a probability dis-
tribution of the probability of positive outcomes. Trust is represented as a triple
of belief, disbelief and uncertainty. Certainty, which is 1 − uncertainty, is defined
by formula 3.10, where x represents the probability of a positive outcome. p and
n represent the number of positive and negative ratings respectively regarding the
evaluator e. The Chernoff bound, shown in formulae 3.11 and 3.12, calculates a
lower bound for a sequence of Nmin independent Bernoulli trials.  is the maximum
level of error (e.g., 0.05) and γ is a confidence measure on the portion of success .
When the number of ratings N se is larger than the lower bound Nmin, the confidence
is 1, otherwise it is 0. When a rating is a discrete or continuous, some heuristics
can be applied such as a piecewise function (31) or a sine function (19). The basic
idea of the two methods is to create a monotonically increasing function on number
of ratings N se that returns a value in the range 0 to 1 inclusive.
CRQ(e, s) = c(p, n) =
1
2
∫ 1
0
| x
p(1− x)n∫ 1
0 x
p(1− x)ndx
− 1|dx (3.10)
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Nmin = − 1
22
ln
1− γ
2
(3.11)
CRQ(e, s) =
{
1 if N se ≥ Nmin
0 Otherwise
(3.12)
d) Confidence for rating quantity at the system level (CRS). The confidence metric at
the system level is derived from the metric CRQ from the query level. One possible
implementation is given by formula 3.13, where E is the evaluator set and S is the
service set in a TMS.
CRS =
∑E
i=1
∑S
j=1CRQ(ei, sj)
|E||S| (3.13)
e) Confidence for referral similarity at the query level (CSQ). The basic idea is to
create a monotonically increasing function based on the quantity of similar referrals
that returns a value in the range [0, 1]. We provide a simple implementation by
formula 3.14, where N se represents the number of similar referrals to the evaluator
e. All of the referrals have at least one rating of a service s. Nthreshold is learned
empirically and it will vary depending on the concrete situation. For instance,
based on the experience of a TMS designer, maybe 3 similar referrals are enough
to evaluate the trust of a hotel. More complicated heuristic approaches have been
proposed such as a piecewise function (31) and a sine function (19).
CSQ(e, s) =
{
Nse
Nthreshold
if N se ≤ Nthreshold
1 otherwise
(3.14)
f) Confidence for referral similarity at the system level (CSS). We define matrix CRnn,
where n is the cardinality of the consumer population. Entry eij is equal to 1 if
there is at least one service which is rated the same by evaluators i and j, otherwise
it is equal to 0. Obviously, the entries on the main diagonal are all equal to 1. CSS
is defined by formula 3.15.
CSS =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 eij
n2
(3.15)
A confidence metric on trust evaluation can be built up from the metrics defined
above. The definition of confidence metrics for trust evaluation at both the system and
the query level are given in formulae 3.16 and 3.17, respectively.
ConfTrust sys = CTS ∗ CRS ∗ CSS (3.16)
ConfTrust query(e, s) = CTQ(e, s) ∗ CRQ(e, s) ∗ CSQ(e, s) (3.17)
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3.1.3 Accuracy of a TMS and Feedback Mechanism
Regarding trust in service provisioning, accuracy of a TMS is the degree of closeness of
trust evaluation of service quality to the evaluator’s personal perception of the service
quality. The accuracy of a TMS is a critical issue since as an Information System
(IS), a TMS becomes rather useless when the system delivers inaccurate results. There
are two reasons influencing the accuracy of a TMS. The first reason is the design of a
trust model. Inadequate design of a trust model decreases the accuracy of a TMS. For
instance, giving the same weight to all the ratings for a hotel is a bad idea since that
is based on the incorrect assumption that every evaluator (traveler) shares the same
standard for rating a hotel service. The second reason is the robustness of a TMS,
which refers to the ability of a TMS to cope with manipulation when a TMS is in use.
Usually the trust model of a TMS is sensitive to the ratings. If the ratings are given
wrongly, the trust model will deliver quite different result. Manipulation refers to the
actions of injecting fraudulent ratings to influence trust evaluation.
The key concept for dealing with inaccurate trust evaluation and for fighting manip-
ulation attempts is feedback. Feedback is a mechanism for adjusting previous ratings
and evaluations by including information regarding their validity. In this subsection
we will argue that a TMS is accurate in the long run given a well-designed feedback
mechanism.
Definition 3.1.1. A rating of a service sj provided by an evaluator ei is represented
by rij. r
(t)
ij stands for a rating given in a time interval (t− 1, t]. The scale of a rating
could be binary, nominal-with-order or continuous. A binary rating represents trust or
distrust. A nominal-with-order scale is the most frequently used type. For instance,
in eBay and Taobao a user can provide a negative, neutral or positive rating; whereas
Amazon and TripAdivsor use a 5-star scheme. Continuous scale is not used very often,
but it is possible to design the scale in this manner. For instance, we can regard the
observed bandwidth of an online file storage service (OFSS) as a continuous-scaled
rating.
Definition 3.1.2. rˆij represents a reference rating which is used to calculate the accu-
racy of a TMS. A reference point is chosen from all the ratings in a TMS. rˆ
(t)
ij stands
for a reference rating given in a time interval (t− 1, t].
Definition 3.1.3. Evaluator group, E, represents the set of evaluators in TMS. E(t)
represents the set of evaluators in a time interval (t− 1, t].
Definition 3.1.4. Service set, Si, represents the set of all the services rated by evaluator
ei. REFj represents the set of referrals who provide ratings to sj. When considering
a rating as an ingredient of trust evaluation, the consumer who provided the rating is
called a referral ref .
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Definition 3.1.5. A weight given to a referral refk with respect to the evaluator ei,
wik, represents to what degree that ei should trust a recommendation of the referral
refk. Note that different referrals correspond to different weights even considering the
same service. w
(t)
ik stands for a weight updated in a time interval (t− 1, t].
Definition 3.1.6. The mismatch of a TMS at time t, MMATCH(t), is defined in
formula 3.18. The metrics of mismatch represents the difference between reference
ratings and trust evaluation with respect to the evaluator group E at time t. For a
TMS without feedback mechanism, w
(t)
ik is always equal to 1.
MMATCH(t) =
|E(t)|∑
i=1
|Si|∑
j=1
|REFj |∑
k=1
|rˆ(t)ij − w(t−1)ik ∗ r(t−1)kj | (3.18)
Lemma 3.1.1. If all the ratings never change over time and the reference ratings are
genuine, then the mismatch of any TMS never increases over time given the feedback
mechanism described by Algorithm 1, where α represents a small real number which
control when a weight update procedure should be ended.
Algorithm 1: Weights update procedure
initialization: ∀i ∈ E(0), j ∈ E(0), i 6= j set w(0)ij = 1;
while |rˆ(t)ij − w(t−1)ik ∗ r(t−1)kj | > α do
if rˆ
(t)
ij > w
(t−1)
ik ∗ r(t−1)kj then
update w
(t)
ik = w
(t−1)
ik +
|rˆ
(t)
ij −r
(t−1)
kj
|
∑REF (j)
a=1 |rˆ
(t)
ij −r
(t−1)
aj |
;
if w
(t)
ik > 1 then
w
(t)
ik = 1;
end
end
if rˆ
(t)
ij < w
(t−1)
ik ∗ r(t−1)kj then
update w
(t)
ik = w
(t−1)
ik −
|rˆ
(t)
ij −r
(t−1)
kj
|
∑REF (j)
a=1 |rˆ
(t)
ij −r
(t−1)
aj |
;
if w
(t)
ik < 0 then
w
(t)
ik = 0;
end
end
end
Proof. Given ∀t, t > 1, rˆ(t−1)ij = rˆ(t)ij and ∀t, t > 1, r(t−1)kj = r(t)kj , when rˆ(t)ij > w(t−1)ik ∗
r
(t−1)
kj , and fixing i, j and k, according to the update rule in algorithm 1, |rˆ(t)ij −w(t−1)ik ∗
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r
(t−1)
kj | ≥ |rˆ(t+1)ij −w(t)ik ∗r(t)kj |. Similarly, when rˆ(t)ij < w(t−1)ik ∗r(t−1)kj , |rˆ(t)ij −w(t−1)ik ∗r(t−1)kj | ≥
|rˆ(t+1)ij − w(t)ik ∗ r(t)kj |. Therefore ∀t, t > 0,MMATCH(t+ 1) ≤MMATCH(t)
Theoretically the mismatch never increases, however, in the practice, we can argue
that the mismatch not only non-increase but also decrease over time. Because it is
nearly impossible to keep the equation 3.19 being true. If we want to keep the equa-
tion 3.19 being true, we need to make sure that the equation 3.20 is true for all the
combination of i, j and k and it is very difficult to achieve in practice. Because for a
certain k, rˆ
(t)
ij does not equal to r
(t−1)
kj .
MMATCH(t) =MMATCH(t+ 1) (3.19)
rˆ
(t)
ij − w(t−1)ik ∗ r(t−1)kj = rˆ(t+1)ij − w(t)ik ∗ r(t)kj (3.20)
Lemma 3.1.2. If all the ratings never change over time, there are a number of fraud-
ulent evaluators, who provide fraudulent reference ratings. The influence on a TMS is
bounded by the feedback mechanism described by algorithm 1.
Proof. According to the update rules of w
(t)
ij described in algorithm 1, rˆ
(t)
ij influences
only the trust evaluation regarding the evaluator ei. Hence, the w
(t)
ij which is effected by
rˆ
(t)
ij will influence the trust evaluation regarding the fraudulent evaluator ei. Over time,
these fraudulent ratings will influence the trust evaluation of other genuine evaluators,
however according to Lemma 3.1.1, the mismatch never increase. Furthermore, in
practice, the mismatch will decrease.
3.2 Trust Building in Service Provisioning Applications
A service, which is the object of trust, refers to the non-material equivalent of a good,
and it is materialized at the moment of service delivery. A TMS is a kind of Information
System where all the information can be collected, processed and propagated in an
electronic manner. We mainly focus on services whose ratings or reviews are available
in a computing environment such as a P2P environment or the Internet. For instance,
there are review websites about services such as hotels, restaurants, doctors, office
cleaning, lawyers, etc. When considering IT-level services, such as Online File Storage
Services (OFSSs), ISPs, e-mail and Web service based applications, ratings and reviews
could be substituted with direct observation of service quality. For instance, an end
user can observe a successful file transfer or Web service delivery. It is effortless to
record these observations programmatically. In the perspective of a TMS, observation,
review, rating and experience are interchangeable. Note that in the IT-level service
provisioning, it is much easier to collect data for a TMS than in the other domains
such as hotel or restaurant reviews.
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Moreover, it is complicated to evaluate trust in a service. This difficulty is because
service quality is unpredictable. For example, the quality of a hotel may improve or
degrade over time. This variation in quality could be due to a variety of reasons such
as substitution of the board, lack of staff training, salary increase, and so on.
Regarding service quality, there are many aspects which a user can perceive. In
further a service can be specified in a hierarchical way (78) in order to evaluate service
quality. Therefore a service can be refined as a set of attributes in terms of trust
evaluation.
Definition 3.2.1. A trust model for an attribute ai of a service, tmi, is an instantiation
of the trust model framework specified by formula 3.1 restricted to an attribute ai.
tmi(e, s) returns the trust value of a service s with respect to an evaluator e and attribute
ai.
Definition 3.2.2. A trust evaluation regarding the service quality, < ATT, TM >, is
a pair of sets. ATT represents a set of refined attributes of a service. TM represents
a set of trust models (tmi) with respect to those attributes. The design of a trust model
tmi regarding attribute ai depends on a variety of criteria which were introduced in
section 3.1.
An evaluator, or a service consumer, which is the subject of trust, refers to a
previous, current or potential user of service. There are two ways of representing the
trust of an evaluator (subject) in a service. Either the trust is represented as a vector of
trust in the attributes of a service, or as a single value which is calculated by aggregating
the trust values restricted to different attributes using a preference structure and value
functions.
A preference structure (PS), defined as a relation on an n-dimensional service eval-
uation space, establishes an order among the points in this space. The definition of the
order mainly depends on the given comparison rule, e.g., lexicographic ordering, Pareto
efficiency ordering or utility function. Utility function (79) refers to a measure of the
relative satisfaction from, or desirability of, consumption of goods or services. Here
we only discuss the utility function, since it is a complete, transitive, reflexive relation.
The universal form of a utility function is represented by formula 3.21. wi stands for a
weight given to a value function V Fi() with respect to attribute ai. A value function
(80) refers to a mapping from the domain of trust evaluation to a satisfaction space.
Whether a consumer satisfies with the trust with respect to attribute ai is determined
by an imperative statement, which refers to the preference that cannot be violated.
Considering, for example, online file storage service (OFSS) with a service consumer
claims that price must less than or equal to 10 $/Month. For attributes with a data
type that is discrete and countable but has no order, e.g., a European customer satisfies
only with that the server is located in EU, the value function is defined as formula 3.22,
where 1 and 0 stand for total satisfaction and total dissatisfaction respectively. It is
more complicated to deal with the attributes with data types having a total order, e.g.,
rating levels, time, price and probability. Because in these cases, the value function
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4Online File Storage Service
(OFSS)
An Online File Storage Service (OFSS) is an Internet service for hosting user files.
Users can backup personal files via the service, they can share photos, audio and video
files. An OFSS allows users to upload files so they can be accessed from any computer
connected to the Internet. Typically, an OFSS allows access via the HTTP-protocol.
An OFSS is mainly used in two ways, the first case being personal file storage. One
can upload files via the Internet and access them again from the same or a different
location. When a local system suffers from data loss, users can recover the system from
a backup stored on the OFSS. In this case, file upload and download speed (bandwidth)
are the most important attributes to consider, since users do not want to spend long
time to update the image of a local system. Data security is an issue, too, because the
files may contain some confidential information.
The second key application is file sharing. As a tool for facilitating information
exchange and sharing among different users, an OFSS provides end users with mech-
anisms for sharing files such as images, documents, music, software, movies, etc. In
the file sharing case, the success of file uploading and downloading might be the most
important features of concern. Users would, for example, find it frustrating when a
movie download fails in between.
Common OFSSs include Amazon S311, Box.net2, Dropbox3, Mozy4, SkyDrive5,
Google Drive6, etc. There is a Wikipedia page7 that specifies several attributes for
OFSSs from a provider’s perspective such as storage size, maximal file size, developer
API support, etc. The attributes specified in the Wikipedia page are not related to trust
1http://aws.amazon.com/s3
2https://www.box.com
3https://www.dropbox.com
4http://mozy.com
5https://skydrive.live.com
6https://drive.google.com
7http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File hosting service
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building since they are specified by a service provider. This has to be distinguished from
attributes such as upload failure rate and file transfer bandwidth, which are defined
from a client’s perspective. The observed value for attributes such as upload failure
rate and file transfer bandwidth can vary over time. Trust models are applicable to a
service for which attributes are client-oriented and variable.
4.1 Trust Models for OFSS
In this section we introduce the attributes that are relevant for defining trust models
for OFSSs. Then we propose trust models for each of the attributes.
4.1.1 Trust Evaluation and Attributes of an OFSS
There are two types of attributes for an OFSS. The first group comprises those stipu-
lated by service providers; they typically have fixed values. They include price, maxi-
mum size of file upload, file transfer security, maximum amount of storage space, etc.
The value is usually stipulated by the service providers. These types of attribute are of
marginal interest from a trust management perspective. The question of whether the
service provider actually supports, e.g., the maximum amount of storage space adver-
tised is easy to check. The questions of how trustworthy a provider is regarding the
complete, correct and timely delivery of a file is much harder to answer.
So the second group subsumes those that are perceived differently from client to
client such as failure rate and bandwidth. Failure rate is defined as the probability with
which a file transfer (either upload or download) is not completed. Bandwidth mea-
sures the number of bits transferred per time unit between the client and the service
provider (or vice versa). The failure rate and bandwidth perceived from an end user in
a village in China can be quite different from one in a big city in USA. There are many
factors influencing the end user experience, therefore traditional failure and perfor-
mance prediction models are not adequate for handling this problem. Comprehensive
performance and failure models are impossible to design due to the complicated and
dynamically-changing configuration parameters of the many instances involved in a file
transfer. Instead of viewing the problem of quality prediction from a service provider’s
perspective, a trust model treats performance and failure modeling from the viewpoint
of the client. This is a different paradigm where the boundary between a user and a
provider is shifted towards the user’s end. Since we do not know (all) the technical
parameters on the way from the client to the server, we effectively have to perform a
black-box test from the client’s end.
It is plausible to state that, the larger a file, the higher the average failure rate,
because the probability of a failure increases over time, and transfer time clearly is pos-
itively correlated with file size. We performed an experiment to justify the hypothesis.
We downloaded three files with different sizes from Amazon S3 for 40 days. The down-
load frequency is uniformly distributed. The small file is a 7MB audio file; the medium
file is a 34MB software setup file; the large file is a 1.2GB movie. Since normally the
failure rate is too small to plot, we show the counterpart, which is success rate. The
value of success rate is equal to 1 minus the value of failure rate. Fig. 4.1 shows the
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represents the probability of the occurrence of a binary event. The beta distribution
f(p|α, β) can be expressed using the gamma function Γ as:
f(p|α, β) = Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 (4.1)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0. The expected value of the beta distribution is given
by formula 4.2.
E(p) =
α
α+ β
(4.2)
An observation is represented as either of the two possible outcomes {SUCCESS,
FAIL}. Let pos be the observed number of outcome SUCCESS, and let neg be the
observed number of outcome FAIL. The relation between neg and α, and that between
pos and β are listed in formula 4.3.
α = neg + 1 and β = pos+ 1 , where pos, neg ≤ 0 (4.3)
Whether a specific file transfer fails or not is a binary event. From Fig. 4.1 we can
see, the failure rate of an OFSS is supposed to be very low (less than 0.03). Because of
the black-box properties, it is hard to distinguish failure events from the client’s end. A
failure event occurring during service provisioning is not equivalent to the observations
of an end user. For instance, a server is down for a whole day, during the day user A
tries to upload a file 100 times and all fail, which doesn’t mean the service renders 100
failure events but one. Otherwise it is unfair to assert that A observes failure 10 times
as much as B, if user B only uploads file 10 times on that day and all fail. Therefore,
we assume that a failure event is a rare event, so the adjacent negative observations
in a short interval (e.g. 24 hours) correspond to only one failure event. After the
adjustment, both A and B observe only one failure. A failure event is well defined
due to the adjustment that the adjacent negative observations in a short interval are
considered as one negative observation.
A beta distribution is an ideally suited for normalizing a trust model because it
assumes that n experiments are independent and the mean is fixed. Each experiment
is independent because the outcomes of n file transfers are independent among each
other. The assumption that the mean of the beta distribution is fixed does not really
translate into our application because the failure rate of an OFSS is not constant as
can be seen from Fig. 4.1. The dynamics of service quality (e.g. failure rate) is one
of the most important features of service provisioning. Though a beta distribution
belongs to the family of Bayesian probability, combining a weight function regarding
time factor with the beta distribution is a better solution than a pure beta system. A
trust model is useless when it cannot capture the dynamics of service quality rapidly.
When calculating the trust value for a service, it is reasonable to assume that
“old” measurements have less influence on the final result than the most recent ob-
servations. Therefore, we divide all the ratings into two classes: old and new ratings.
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Based on the structure information, we develop a weight representing the geograph-
ical similarity of nodes. Note that the structure is equivalent to a forest in graph theory.
The measurement of similarity of two nodes is to compare two vertices in a forest. The
measurement is implemented by Algorithm 2, where the function parent() returns the
parent vertex of two nodes. e represents a trust evaluator and ref represents a referral
who provides rating(s). ve and cref represent the corresponding vertices. The function
DIS() calculates the number of hops between two vertices. The only parameter of this
algorithm is µ which is in the interval [0, 1]; µ controls how quickly the weight decays
exponentially. The reason why the similarity function is implemented by an exponen-
tial function is that it follows the intuition that the longer the distance between the
vertices and their common parent, the less similar they are.
Algorithm 2: Measure geographical similarity
input : A forest regarding administrative divisions F , α, µ, two vertices ve and
vref
output: similarity measurement wgeo(e, ref)
if ve and vref overlap then
wgeo(e, ref) = 1;
else
if parent(ve, vref ) = ∅ then
wgeo(e, ref) = 0;
else
wgeo(e, ref) = µ
MAX(DIS(parent(ve,vref ),ve),DIS(parent(ve,vref ),vref ));
end
end
An alternative measurement of geographical similarity is to consider the great-circle
distance d between two points on the earth. The similarity measurement is given by
formula 4.6, where MAX is the largest circle distance between two points on the
equator (approximately equal to 20,000 km). The standard formula for calculating the
great-circle distance d can be found in (83).
wgeo(e, ref) = 1− d
MAX
(4.6)
The trust model for the failure rate is defined by formula 4.8, where i represents
the index of a rating and evai represents the evaluator (referral) providing the rating
i. w(i, e) represents the weight given to a rating i regarding a trust evaluator e. rsi
represents a rating i of a service s. The value of rsi is equal to one for an unsuccessful
file transfer and zero for a successful file transfer.
w(i, e) = wtw(i) ∗ wip(e, evai) ∗ wgeo(e, evai) (4.7)
TMFR(e, s) =
∑R(s),rsi=1
i=1 w(i, e)∑R(s),rsi=1
i=1 w(i, e) +
∑R(s),rsi=0
i=1 w(i, e)
(4.8)
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than the IAB observed by the referral ref, this observation is ignored. The similarity
weight function is given by formula 4.11.
wia(e, ref) =
{
1 if IAB(e) ≤ IAB(ref)
0 otherwise
(4.11)
The trust model for bandwidth is defined by formulae 4.12 and 4.13. w(i, e) repre-
sents the weight given to a rating i regarding a trust evaluator e. In formula 4.13, the
function argmax() calculates the maximal value with respect to an outcome i among
all the possibilities of outcomes, i.e. the set very slow, slow, acceptable, good, fast.
w(i, e) = wtw(i) ∗ wip(e, evai) ∗ wgeo(e, evai) ∗ wia(e, evai) (4.12)
TMBW (e, s) = argmax
i
(
1 +
∑R(s),rsj=ci
j=1 w(j, e)∑K
k=1
(
1 +
∑R(s),rsj=ck
j=1 w(j, e)
)
)
(4.13)
4.1.4 Trust Models Considering Social Networks
When information provided by end users regarding the service under consideration is
available from social networks, it can be included into a trust model. A simple approach
would look like this:
a) A TMS broadcasts an observation of a user to others.
b) Users rate each others’ observation by comparing them with their own findings and
then explicitly agree (+) or disagree(-).
c) Representing each user as a vertex in a graph, an edge is created if two users agree
with each others’ observations. The resulting graph represents the social network’s
“opinion” of the resp. service. It also allows an estimate of a user’s “trustworthiness”
based on the amount of agreement expressed by the other users; this is captured by
wiso in formula 4.14, where dG(i) represents the degree of vertex i.
wiso =
dG(i) + 1
2|E(G)|+ |V (G)| (4.14)
Considering the new weighting function, the original formulae 4.7 and 4.12 can be
easily modified to use in the trust models considering social network. We define the
corresponding weighting function for failure rate in formula 4.15 by adding the weight
wiso in the original formula 4.7. For bandwidth, the new weighting function is defined in
formula 4.16. The original formulas 4.8 and 4.13 remain to build up the corresponding
trust models considering social networks.
w(i, e) = wtw(i) ∗ wip(e, evai) ∗ wgeo(e, evai) ∗ wiso (4.15)
w(i, e) = wtw(i) ∗ wip(e, evai) ∗ wgeo(e, evai) ∗ wia(e, evai) ∗ wiso (4.16)
46


4.2 Manipulation Detection Mechanisms for OFSSs
actual user activities with statistical methods in order to detect anomalies which may
hint at manipulative behavior. Note that, the set of users here is defined differently.
In this section, the whole user set represents all the users who share a similar context
defined in 4.1.2. A sample user is a user who is trusted by a TMS. Therefore, the refer-
ence patterns generated by trusted users define the characteristics of non-manipulative
behavior. By creating a baseline sample, a root of trust is built up and all the trust
propagations can be made based on this root. The difference between observations from
all the users and sample users reflects the precision of prediction regarding trust eval-
uation. By comparing a baseline with the distribution of observations obtained from
the whole population, it is possible to identify manipulative intentions, which results
in removing the ratings given by such users from the TMS. The question is when the
difference of a reference pattern from the baseline is significant so it can be assumed to
reflect manipulation.
Considering observations of all the honest users as a subset of the population, we
can extract some samples from the subset. In order for the samples to be representative,
a number of “trusted” users are selected based on statistical theory (85). The basic
idea is to create a statistic, e.g. sample mean and sample variance, from a small
number of “trusted” users, and compare it to the same statistic generated by ratings
(observations) from the whole population which might contain dishonest users. There
are two approaches for implementing a comparison algorithm. Either a confidence
interval is used to indicate the reliability of an estimate of a baseline. Or we compare
the shape of a baseline distribution to the whole population of users.
The first approach is uses a confidence-interval-based BS. Under the condition of
independence among observations, a sequence of file transfers can be considered as n
Bernoulli trials which fulfill the binomial distribution B(n, p). Since the failure rate
is supposed to be very low, the probability of success of a file transfer p is very close
to 1. Hence the number of failures in a small time interval can be approximated by
a Poisson distribution Pois(λ). An interval T , e.g. one month, can be partitioned
into subintervals ti of one day. ti is short enough to capture the possible failure events
during the whole interval T . λ is a positive real number denoting the expected number
of failures in T . The BS aims to find out the parameter λ by sampling. In the design
of BS we define a random sample with size m in which the set of observations is
{X1, X2, X3, ..., Xm}. λ is estimated by formula 4.19.
λˆ = E(X) = X¯ =
∑m
i=1Xi
m
(4.19)
In accordance with the central limit theorem and the rule of thumb, if m is larger
than or equal to 30, then the normal approximation Z will be satisfactory to model the
distribution of estimated λ regardless of the shape of the population distribution (86).
A normal approximation refers to the transformation that a distribution is represented
approximately by a normal distribution. The shape of the population distribution is a
Poisson distribution in this case. The confidence interval of λ is given by formula 4.20,
where t denotes a t-distribution and α stands for the significance level of a test (86).
λˆ− tα
2
,m−1 ∗
S√
m
≤ λ ≤ λˆ+ tα
2
,m−1 ∗
S√
m
(4.20)
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Figure 4.6: Graph based BS with respect to upload bandwidth
Let M (M >> m) be the number of all the users who have a similar context, and
ni be the number of trials for one user i in T . It is reasonable to assume that when
all the ni are sufficiently large and qi sufficiently small, then all the Xi, where i is
a natural number between 1 and M , can be considered random variables of the same
Poisson distribution. We assume the expected value of number of the failures occurring
in T to be a constant. The assumption of a Poisson distribution is reasonable, since an
OFSS provider treats all the users who have a similar context in an unbiased way, and
the Internet has an oscillating impact on each end users in terms of failure rate and
bandwidth.
Regarding bandwidth, context-based trust evaluation implies the distribution of
user-observed bandwidth fulfills a normal distribution N(µ, σ2). Let the number of
trusted users be m. Then the interval estimation of mean and its confidence interval
regarding the attribute of bandwidth are given by formulae 4.21 and 4.22.
E(X) = X¯ =
∑m
i=1Xi
m
(4.21)
X¯ − tα
2
,m−1 ∗
S√
m
≤ µ ≤ X¯ + tα
2
,m−1 ∗
S√
m
(4.22)
The second approach is a graph-based BS. First, we plot the graph of probability
density function (PDF) or probability mass function (PMF) with respect to number of
failures and bandwidth provided by trusted users. Then we compare the shape of the
graph with the corresponding graph of PDF or PMF with respect to the whole popula-
tion of users. Note that the graph regarding the whole user population is difficult to be
fitted to a distribution, since it is expected to contain fraudulent observations. Instead,
we replace the PDF graph generated from the whole population with a histogram. We
compare the shape of the graph generated from observations of trusted users with that
of the histogram. In addition, by using confidence-interval-based BS, sometimes the
manipulative behavior can be ignored. For instance, assume that a number of dishon-
est users report the bandwidth is 10Kbit/s for slandering, while other dishonest users
report 1Mbit/s for promoting. The confidence interval can be between 10Kbit/s and
1Mbit/s and so does the mean of honest users. Usually it is impossible to detect the
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case that both types of manipulation are operating simultaneously using confidence-
interval-based BS. Therefore graph-based BS is superior to confidence-interval-based
BS.
Figure 4.7: Graph based BS with respect to upload failure rates
Figs. 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate to cases using graph-based BS. In Fig. 4.6, the hori-
zontal represents the observed value of upload bandwidth in unit of 10 Kbit/s. The
vertical axis shows the corresponding probability. The black curve depicting a normal
distribution corresponds to BS. The blue histogram represents the distribution gener-
ated by the whole population. The extremely high bar at 370 Kbit/s means there are
many users observing a bandwidth is as large as 370 Kbit/s, which is not supported by
the base line. This is a typical example of manipulative behavior (promoting). Fig. 4.7
shows both promoting and slandering are attempted with respect to the failure rate.
As we can see, the mean value of the Poisson distribution for the base line is 2. However
there are two abnormal regions where some users report zero failures and some report
more than eight failures.
We propose algorithms 3 and 4 for detecting manipulative behavior with respect
to bandwidth and failure rate, respectively. The basic idea for the detection algorithm
for manipulation of bandwidth measurement is firstly to find a point rep which has the
highest probability within the interval [meanbs − σbs, meanbs + σbs] in the histogram.
rep is a representative point which is supposed to have the highest probability in the
whole histogram, because it is inside of the confidence interval of the base line and it
has a high probability. meanbs and σbs are the parameters of a normal distribution with
respect to BS. The algorithm then compares rep with the points outside the interval,
if there exists a point x in the histogram such that p(x)/p(rep) is larger than the
pre-defined threshold thnormal which is larger than one, then we consider the point as
evidence of manipulation. This threshold follows the intuition that when a point which
is outside of the interval [meanbs−σbs, meanbs+σbs] and has a higher probability, it can
be the indicator of manipulative behavior. Because based on the shape of distribution
with respect to the base line, the probability is extremely low.
The idea of the representative point is also used for finding attempts at promoting
a service provider with respect to failure rate in algorithm 4. Here, the representative
point is called reppro and the interval is [mean− 1, mean+ 1]. Furthermore, in order
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to find the evidence of slandering manipulation, we identify the second representative
point repsla which is defined by the distribution for very unlikely events, i.e., p(repsla) =
poiss(repsla|λ) ≈ 0, for instance p(repsla) < 0.01. If there exists a point x in the
histogram, that p(x)/p(repsla) is larger than a pre-defined threshold th
sla
poiss, then we
consider the point as the evidence of slandering manipulation. The similar justification
can be given here as above.
Algorithm 3: Graph based BS regarding bandwidth
input : pdf regarding BS pbs(x) and pdf regarding the whole population p(x)
output: manipulation type: ManiType
Initialization: ManiType := unknown;
Find a point rep which has the highest probability in
[meanbs − σbs,meanbs + σbs] ;
for all the x do
if (x−meanbs) > +σbs AND p(x)p(rep) > thnormal then
ManiType := promoting;
else
if (meanbs − x) < −σbs AND p(x)p(rep) > thnormal then
if ManiType == unknown then
ManiType := slandering;
else
ManiType := both;
end
end
end
end
A key issue of BS is to create and manage a small set of trusted users according to
the dynamic properties of a target system. There are three properties to be considered:
the size of a group, frequency of file transfer and variation of service quality.
The size of a group refers to the number of end users in a group which is formed
considering context such as geographical location, network prefix, etc. Regarding the
size, in the case of practical interest (86), if the number of trusted users is larger than
30 the normal approximation for a distribution of sample mean will be satisfactory
regardless of the shape of the population. If the number is less than 30, the central
limit theorem plays a role if the distribution of the population is not severely non-
normal.
The frequency of file transfer with respect to a normal user is changing over time.
Due to an assumption when using the Poisson distribution regarding failure rate, one
observation per subinterval, e.g. per day, is necessary to capture possible failures during
an interval T (e.g. one month). Regarding bandwidth, more frequent observations are
required due to the assumption that service quality may vary significantly during an
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interval T .
Algorithm 4: Graph based BS regarding failure rate
input : pdf regarding BS pbs(x) and pdf regarding the whole population p(x)
output: manipulation type: ManiType
Initialization: ManiType := unknown;
Find a point reppro which has the highest probability in
[meanbs − 1,meanbs + 1] ;
Find a point repsla which is larger than meanbs + 1 and poiss(repsla|λ) ;
for all the x do
if x < meanbs AND
p(x)
pbs(x)
> thpropoiss AND
p(x)
p(reppro)
> 1 then
ManiType := promoting;
else
if x > repsla AND
p(x)
p(repsla)
> thslapoiss then
if ManiType == unknown then
ManiType := slandering;
else
ManiType := both;
end
end
end
end
The service quality may vary in the long term, but once the assumption about
distribution with respect to failure rate and bandwidth is fulfilled and the interval
T is well selected, BS is capable of capturing service quality variation and resisting
manipulation. Based on the discussion above, the management of trusted users is
specified as follows:
a) select qualified trusted users initially;
b) check the quality of trusted users periodically. The quality of a trusted user contains
frequency of file transfer, distribution of file transfer time per day, distribution of
size of transferred file, etc. If there is at least one unqualified user, the TMS executes
an update operation. An update operation is defined as an operation which replaces
each unqualified user by a new qualified user.
4.2.2 Clique Identification
When social network information is available for users involved in a TMS, this informa-
tion can be used to identify manipulative groups. Assume that one user could submit a
report about whether he/she trusts the observation of another user. On the one hand,
for the sake of increasing trustworthiness of dishonest users, they give positive ratings
to their own company. On the other hand, honest users give ratings depending on how
similar their observation is with respect to the other users. Following this idea, it is
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Parameter Value
Promoting
Dishonest User Proportion (DUP) 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%
File Transfer Frequency (FTF) 2x, 4x, 6x
Bandwidth Offset (BO) 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%
Slandering
Dishonest User Proportion (DUP) 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%
Number of Failure Offset (NFO) 0, 1, 2, 3
Bandwidth Offset (BO) 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%
Both
Dishonest User Proportion (DUP) 30%, 50%, 70%
Ratio of Promoter to Slanderer (RPS) 1:9, 3:7, 5:5, 7:3, 9:1
Bandwidth Offset (BO) 90%
Combination of FTF and NFO (2x, 1), (2x, 2), (4x, 1), (4x, 2)
Table 4.1: Parameters setting for modeling manipulative behavior
for how often files are transferred per day. The intensity with respect to bandwidth is
simulated by bandwidth offset (BO) which is calculated by formula 4.24.
BO =
|meanhon −meandis|
meanhon
(4.24)
For instance, if the mean of the bandwidth distribution observed by honest users is
equal to 100Kbit/s, then BO = 0.3 defines that the mean of the distribution generated
by promoters would be 130Kbit/s. Regarding slandering, the intensity in terms of
failure rate is characterized by number of failure offset (NFO) per week which represents
the difference of the mean values of the Poisson distributions for dishonest users and
honest users. For bandwidth the same parameter BO is used. For dealing with both
promoting and slandering we reuse all the parameters above. In addition, the Ratio
of Promoter to Slanderer (RPS) is specified to characterize the contrast between the
two types of manipulation. According to the combination of parameters, 400 test cases
without dirty data, 48 for promoting, 64 for slandering and 60 for both are generated.
4.3.2 Simulation Results
For each test case, two time series of trust evaluation are calculated by considering all
users on one hand and the honest ones only on the other. Afterwards, the deviation of
trust evaluation at time t is calculated by formula 4.25, where TM(e, s) stands for a
trust model. The trust model regarding failure rate is implemented by formula 4.8; the
trust model regarding bandwidth is implemented by formula 4.13. TMt(e, s) stands for
a trust evaluation at time t. TMallt (e, s) and TM
gen
t (e, s) represent the trust evaluation
at time t considering all the users and honest users only, respectively. We specify a
representative point in the series as the deviation of trust deviation under manipulation
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(Trust Dev). For example take the point which has the highest deviation in the series as
the representative point. In this case, each test case is assigned to a value of maximum
deviation (MaxDev).
Devt =
TMallt (e, s)− TMgent (e, s)
TMgent (e, s)
(4.25)
In the simulation, we first evaluate how many percentage of manipulation can be
detected by using both graph-based BS and confidence-interval-based BS. The results
for all types of manipulation on failure rate (FR) are shown in Figs. 4.10, 4.11 and
4.12. In Fig. 4.10 there are 48 points representing 48 test cases for promoting. The
points are color coded in terms of MaxDev. The colored scale on the right-hand side
relates the colors of the dots to the values of trust deviation. The lighter the color,
the larger the trust deviation. The points with dotted circles are the test cases which
are not detected as manipulation. As we can see from Fig. 4.10, only points with low
trust deviation scores are circled. The fact shows that by using BS the manipulative
behavior can influence the trust evaluation within a small range.
Figure 4.10: Promoting detection using BS regarding failure rate
Figs. 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 indicate that for the three types of manipulation regarding
FR, the MaxDev of a TMS using BS turns out to be much less than that without using
it. Because if the strength of manipulation is too large, the manipulative behavior will
be detected out by BS. This simulation result shows that using BS the manipulative
behavior can be restricted in a small range. In addition, none of the 400 test cases
without contamination is detected as manipulation by mistake. We show the result for
both FR and bandwidth in table 4.2.
Moreover, when social network information is considered, the advanced trust models
introduced in 4.2.4 and clique identification (CI) technique are involved. The differences
between the two approaches with respect to advanced trust models are indicated by
Figs. 4.13, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18.
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Figure 4.11: Slandering detection using BS regarding failure rate
Figure 4.12: Both promoting and slandering detection using BS regarding failure rate
Manipulation Type MaxDev without Detection MaxDev with BS
Promoting on FR 28.1% 4.6%
Slandering on FR -32.1% -6%
Both on FR -15.9% ∼ 13.4% 0% ∼ 8.21%
Promoting on Bandwidth 68.3% 14.5%
Slandering on Bandwidth -46% -10%
Both on Bandwidth -24.8% ∼ 59.6% -10% ∼ 15%
Table 4.2: Simulation results for baseline sampling (BS)
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In Figs. 4.13 and 4.14 we show the results for detecting of promotion for bandwidth
using BS and CI, respectively. There are 48 points representing 48 test cases for pro-
moting like previous experiment. The points are color coded in terms of the maximum
deviation. The points with dotted circles are the test cases which are detected as ma-
nipulation. As we can see from Fig. 4.13, only two points with very low trust deviation
are circled. In Fig. 4.14, it is shown that CI works better than BS by successfully
detecting one more test case.
Figure 4.13: Promoting detection using BS regarding bandwidth
Figure 4.14: Promoting detection using CI regarding bandwidth
In Figs. 4.15 and 4.16, we show the results for slandering detection for bandwidth
using BS and CI, respectively. There are 64 points representing 64 test cases for slan-
dering like previous experiment. The points are color coded in terms of the maximum
deviation. The points with dotted circles are the test cases which are not detected as
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manipulation. As we can see from Fig. 4.15, 11 points with very low trust deviation
are circled. Fig. 4.16 shows that CI works better than BS by successfully detecting
four more test cases.
Figure 4.15: Slandering detection using BS regarding bandwidth
Figure 4.16: Slandering detection using CI regarding bandwidth
In Figs. 4.17 and 4.18, we show the results for mixed promoting/slandering detec-
tion for bandwidth using BS and CI, respectively. There are 64 points representing 60
test cases. The points are color coded as before. The points with dotted circles are
the test cases which are not able to be detected as manipulation. Fig. 4.17 indicates
the case considering only two BS approaches, which are confidence-interval-based BS
and graph-based BS. As we can see from Fig. 4.17, four points with very low trust
deviation are circled. Fig. 4.18 shows that CI works better than BS by successfully
detecting all the test cases for manipulation.
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The range of deviation for all types of attack in terms of bandwidth is shown in
Table 4.3. Note the range of MaxDev without considering any detection mechanisms
using the trust models considering social network information is much larger than that
using the basic trust models only. Since dishonest users rate each other with high
value such that the trust models considering social network give more weight to the
fraudulent observations than the basic trust models. However, by using CI combined
with advanced trust models, the effect of manipulative behavior is largely restricted.
For instance, all 60 test cases for both promoting and slandering manipulation are
successfully detected. In this particular case, deviation of the TMS is zero. The CI is
performed by considering several key parameters such as degree of recognition. Degree
of recognition refers to what extent a user agrees with the observation of others. In the
simulation, the degree of recognition for dishonest users is fixed to 100%, which means
the dishonest users in the same group agree with each other completely. The degree of
recognition for honest clients is fixed to 80%.
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Services
5.1 A Case Study for Online Shopping Services
In this section, we choose Taobao.com (the largest Chinese e-commerce website) as a
dataset for an online shopping service. Given context of reputation, we can extract
characters or assumptions of manipulative behavior from Taobao.com. According to
the characters, we present a manipulation detection system, Clustering based Suspect
Identification (CSI) that can detect the customers who provide fraudulent ratings, and
the vendors who intend to manipulate their trust value. We propose a lightweight trust
model, R-Rep, for resisting attempts at manipulation. We suggest two approaches,
Ranking Comparison Index (RCI) and Benefit Variation Ratio (BVR), for comparing
different trust models with regard to resisting manipulative behavior. Finally the ex-
perimental results show that R-Rep outperforms two existing trust models, the trust
model employed by Taobao itself and a Beta Reputation System (82). Comparing the
statistics of the whole population to the suspicious sub population, we explore charac-
teristics of suspects intensively and discover some patterns and phenomena.
5.1.1 Online Shopping Services and Taobao.com
Online shopping or online retailing (e.g. Amazon.com) is a form of e-commerce service
allowing consumers to buy goods or services from a vendor over the Internet. A typical
online shopping process consists of the following steps: A customer searches and selects
a vendor who provides the product or service the customer wants on an online shopping
website. The customer can use a virtual shopping cart to collect multiple items and to
adjust quantities. After paying the bill the customer receives an e-mail confirmation
after the transaction is complete. The products or services will be delivered to the
customers within a promised time interval. The methods of delivery depend on the
type of product or service. For digital media products such as software, music, movies
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or images, the customer can download them directly; for tickets, codes, or coupons, the
customer can print them out; for a product such as clothes and shoes, they are shipped
to the customers address.
For our case study we chose Chinese B2C online store Taobao.com1. There are
several reasons why Taobao was chosen as the target of our research. Taobao is the
largest e-commerce platform in China. It reported 250 million registered users and
over 700 million products for sale in 2010. In this ecosystem, people can make a large
profit by providing fraudulent ratings. Furthermore, there is a community surrounding
manipulative behavior exchanging knowledge about a couple of interesting topics, such
as the jargon for launching an attack and the possible detection strategies applied by
Taobao. There are some special tools2 assisting manipulation as well. After the investi-
gation of manipulative behavior on Taobao, we conclude three significant assumptions
in Taobao.
a) Dishonest customers are apt to provide fraudulent ratings for less expensive product
in order to reduce risk.
b) Most of the dishonest customers are not personally known by vendors.
c) The dishonest customers aim at maximizing their profit.
The first assumption is called the “assumption of risk aversion”. A statistical study
shows that, a vendor usually pays 5-10 cents for an inauthentic review which is associ-
ated with a fake transaction (59). A dishonest customer will not take the risk of paying
too much and confirming a fake transaction. If a vendor cooperates with the dishonest
customer and pays the bill (e.g. 10 Euro) back, the dishonest customer can get 5-10
cents; if not, the customer will lose 10 Euro directly. Regarding the second assumption,
due to the huge number of transactions per day, it is impossible for a vendor to maintain
such a big friend list. In addition, the second assumption is a prerequisite for the third
assumption. Considering a tiny profit, a dishonest customer must provide fraudulent
reviews as much as he can in order to earn a fortune. The three assumptions are the
root of trust, and our work is built up based on the three assumptions. We believe that
an assumption-based solution for manipulation identification is a valid approach due to
the complexity of the concept (trust). Given a context of trust, we can capture the ba-
sic patterns, which are refined as basic assumptions or characteristics. Based on these
assumptions, a concrete trust model can be derived from the trust model framework,
which was introduced in chapter 3, and different learning algorithms can be applied
to identify different types of manipulation regarding different contexts. In the case of
Taobao, we follow the three assumptions above.
The dataset is collected as follows. A set of 1081 target vendors are located by
choosing “Nokia Smartphone” as the search keyword. In Fig. 5.1, we can see there are
two fitting lines crossing at point two. The steeper line is fitted by the customers who
have at most two purchases per day; the other line is fitted by the ones who have more
than two purchases per day. They have totally different slopes and based on the third
1www.taobao.com
2www.schuaxinyong.com, www.tuzi88.com
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Figure 5.1: Daily volume of purchases vs. number of customers
Data Type Data Size
Vendor (API) 1,081
Customer (API) 460,095
Customer (Web Crawl) 8,981
Vendor Related Rating (Web Crawl) 1,241,481
Customer Related Rating (Web Crawl) 1,229,352
Table 5.1: Basic statistics of the Taobao dataset
assumption, we believe the customers whose daily purchase number is greater than or
equal to three are more suspicious than the rest of the customers. The rating history
of a set of 12,657 customers is selected by truncating the number of daily purchase to
a minimum of three. Since some customers’ rating history is unavailable, we only have
rating histories of 8,981 customers. In addition, for both vendors and customers, we
record the global attributes, which are gathered via Taobao’s APIs, such as reputation
value, life span, etc. The general statistics of this dataset are listed in Table 5.1.
5.1.2 Clustering Based Suspect Identification (CSI)
The basic idea of clustering based suspect identification (CSI) is as follows. We as-
sume that the statistical characteristic of a suspicious object (customer or vendor) is
distinguishable from that of a normal object. Hence, it is possible to recognize the set
of suspicious vendors and customers by analyzing features of their behavior. It is rea-
sonable to assume that there is a strong relationship between suspicious customers and
suspicious vendors. Suspicious vendors “hire” suspicious customers to provide fraudu-
lent ratings. We can identify a set of suspicious vendors using this alliance relationship.
It is essential to obtain different sets of suspects using anonymous ratings and non-
anonymous ratings. An anonymous rating is provided by a customer whose identity
is not visible. The union of these sets should identify suspicious activity with higher
confidence. The practical contribution of our identification approach is to assist the op-
erator of TMSs in detecting manipulative behavior. It is theoretically possible to verify
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the validity of every transaction in a TMS. For instance, Taobao can check whether
products or services are genuinely shipped from a vendor to a customer. Practically it
is impossible to check every transaction due to the huge number of transactions. There-
fore, the detection result delivered by our approach is a suitable method for reducing
the number of transactions that need to be checked.
5.1.2.1 Suspicious Customer Identification
We specify five main features for characterizing manipulative behavior of customers.
a) Number of vendors (NV). Total number of vendors a customer has transacted with.
b) Average price (AP). The mean of the monetary value of transactions.
c) Number of transactions per vendor (NTV). The mean number of transactions a
customer makes with a vendor.
d) Number of transactions per day (NTD). Mean number of transactions that a cus-
tomer has made in one day.
e) Number of vendors per day (NVD). The mean number of vendors, a customer has
dealt with per day.
Based on the assumption of maximization of profit, the values of NV, NTV, NTD
and NVD for a suspicious customer should be much higher than for a normal customer.
In addition, based on the assumption of risk aversion, the value of AP for a suspicious
customer should be lower than for a normal customer. We consider suspicious customer
identification as a classic unsupervised learning procedure, since nobody can assert that
a customer is definitely a “bad” one. Following this idea, we use the k-means algorithm
in weka1 to cluster vendors and customers. We tried different sets of parameters and the
final result is given in Table 5.2. The first two clusters are considered to be suspicious.
Cluster one (C1) has a very high value for NTV, 3.1708. By contrast, C1 has low value
for AP, which is 0.0734. Cluster two (C2) is considered as a suspicious group because
of higher values for NV, NVD and NTD and a small value for AP. On the other hand,
clusters C3, C4, C5 and C6 do not show similar characters to C1 and C2 in terms of
value for NV, NTV, NTD, NVD and AP. In total, 1616 suspicious customers have been
identified.
5.1.2.2 Suspicious Vendor Identification
We propose three different methods for identifying suspicious vendors in this section.
The first method explores the alliance relationship between a suspicious customer and
a suspicious vendor, and derives the suspicious vendors from the suspicious customers.
The second method aims at analyzing the statistical features of behavior with respect
to vendors by considering only non-anonymous ratings. The third method identifies
suspicious vendors by considering only anonymous ratings.
1A collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks.
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NTV NV AP NVD NTD
C1 (1603) 3.1708 0.2022 0.0734 0.0447 0.1965
C2 (13) 0.8928 11.4335 0.018 17.6873 18.4477
C3 (20) 1.1426 0.0083 15.6623 0.0321 0.0338
C4 (4497) 0.7946 0.2004 0.4905 0.2344 0.241
C5 (542) 0.7619 0.0845 2.3808 0.1592 0.1618
C6 (2306) 1.8195 0.1954 0.1823 0.065 0.1601
Table 5.2: Customers clustering results
a) From customers to vendors
Once the set of suspicious customers is identified, it is not difficult to find the
corresponding set of suspicious vendors. If a customer account is used to provide
fraudulent ratings, the probability that the person behind also uses this account
for regular transactions is very low, because usually people do not want to mix
their serious business and regular life together. The number of transactions which a
suspicious customer has performed with a vendor is a key feature for discovering an
alliance relation. If a suspicious customer has traded with a vendor very often e.g.
10 times per day, then the vendor is considered as suspicious as well. By choosing
a threshold for the number empirically, i.e. three in our evaluation, 1616 suspicious
customers correspond to a set of 63 suspicious vendors (SV1).
Figure 5.2: Time series of electronic product sales volume
b) Considering non-anonymous ratings
SV1 is derived from analyzing the relationship between suspicious customers and
vendors, where the information of non-anonymous ratings is involved. In this case,
anonymous ratings cannot be used to relate a vendor to a customer. We can perform
an analysis on the same type of information from the perspective of a vendor. Two
main features for characterizing the manipulative behavior of a vendor are specified.
• Ratio of small to total sales (RSTS). RSTS indicates the proportion of small
transactions among all the transactions.
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RSTS M-Day
C1(295) 2.2726 1.3544
C2(786) 0.3014 0.121
Table 5.3: Results of vendors clustering
• M-Day. M-Day is the short name for the number of days when the manipu-
lative behavior probably occurs. It is necessary to analyze vendor’s behavior
based on temporal information. Manually we identify some suspicious vendors
by analyzing inconsistent purchase behavior such as the one shown in Fig. 5.2.
At the beginning, in order to accumulate trust value, the vendor generates
a large number of fraudulent ratings on some cheap products, such as some
accessories of a cell phone. With the increase of trust, it is not necessary for
him to promote the trust value any more. Therefore after around 60 days,
the vendor stops manipulation and behaves normally. In order to capture the
character of manipulation, we specify two sub features on daily base.
– Ratio of small to total sales regarding time series (RSTS TS). The defi-
nition of RSTS TS is very similar to that of RSTS, except that the former
operates at the daily level.
– Average number of transactions per customer regarding time series (NTC
TS). This feature calculates the average number of transactions that a
customer makes with the vendor on a given day. The value of NTC TS is
equal to the volume of sales divided by the number of customers who have
traded with the vendor on that day.
We tried different values for parameters regarding k-means (e.g., Euclidean distance
function, number of clusters, maximum iteration number, etc.) and the final result
is given in Table 5.3. A set of 295 suspicious vendors (SV2) is identified.
The union of SV1 and SV2 is not the final result. The basic idea of identifying
suspects regarding non-anonymous ratings is to gather the evidence of different
aspects, and consider them all. In order to reinforce our conclusion, we combine the
two results by an intersection operation. Finally we obtain a set of 57 suspicious
vendors (SV3).
c) Considering anonymous ratings
Some vendors gain trust by obtaining fraudulent anonymous ratings due to the
characteristics of anonymous ratings. An anonymous rating can be created in two
manners in Taobao. In the first case, all the ratings on a virtual product, such as
software, pre-paid card, phone card, etc., are automatically labeled as anonymous.
The relationship between the customer and the vendor of an anonymous rating
is not traceable. The second case is that a customer sets the state of a rating
as anonymous, maybe because of privacy concerns. This, however, happens very
rarely. The greatest advantage of manipulating trust by providing an anonymous
rating is the untraceability of the anonymous rating, since there is not a physical
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delivery process. However, it is questionable that a vendor who sells mobile phones
has achieved a great number of virtual product transactions.
Figure 5.3: The distribution of vendors over the percentage of anonymous ratings
Identification of suspicious vendors considering anonymous ratings is performed by
truncating the distribution of vendors over the percentage of anonymous ratings.
Fig. 5.3 shows that, most of the vendors have a small percentage of anonymous
ratings. We identify a set of 27 vendors (SV4) by setting the threshold to 95%.
The intersection of SV1 and SV4 is empty, and so is the intersection of SV2 and SV4.
The empty result is expected, since there is little overlap between different types of
suspicious vendors detected by using different types of information (non-anonymous
and anonymous ratings). Suspicious vendors might apply different strategies, for
instance non-anonymous or anonymous ratings, to manipulate trust value. In other
words, suspicious vendors can be classified into different groups. In our case, there
are two groups SV3 and SV4.
5.1.3 The R-Rep Trust Model
A restrictive reputation model, R-Rep, is proposed to increase the robustness of a
TMS. According to the assumptions introduced in section 5.1.1, R-Rep assigns different
weights to different ratings according to the monetary value of a transaction and relative
rating-provision frequency of a customer. Rating-provisioning frequency refers to the
frequency a customer provides ratings. R-Rep is formalized in formula 5.1, where rsi
represents a rating of a service s, cust(i) denotes a function which maps a rating to
its corresponding customer, and prod(i) maps a rating to the corresponding product.
RPprod(i) stands for the relative price of product prod(i) among all transactions relating
to target vendors. RFcust(i) stands for the relative frequency of customer s(i)’s rating
provisioning. The basic idea of this formula is to give more weight to the rating which
is given on more expensive products than cheap ones. Less weight is given to the rating
which is provided by the customer who has already provided many ratings. There are
many functions for modeling RP and RF. We assume that some of the functions work
better than the others. Here we provide some possibilities.
The function for RPprod(i), which is formalized in formula 5.2, is implemented as a
variation of sigmoid function. β controls the height of the “S” shape of sigmoid function
and λ/β is the upper bound of the function for RPprod(i). The function reaches the
lower bound when the variable pprod(i) is equal to 0. The sum divided by |Ntran|,
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where |Ntran| represents the number of transactions of interest, denotes the average
price for products. Pprod(j) is the price of a product prod(j). The “S” shape of sigmoid
function represent the idea that, the more expensive the transaction, the more weight
the rating of the transaction has. For RFcust(i), which is formalized in formula 5.3, it is
implemented as a parabola function, where κ is used to control the shape of the curve.
The idea is to give less weight to the rating which is provided by the customer who has
already provided many ratings. In a B2C system like Taobao, it is very suspicious for
a customer to provide many ratings per day. fcust(i) is the frequency of purchase for a
customer cust(i). Following the similar idea as above, formula 5.4 and 5.5 implement
RFcust(i) as an exponential and a squared exponential function respectively, where α is
the parameter to control the shape of the function.
TM(s) =
R(s)∑
i=1
rsi ∗
RPprod(i)
RFcust(i)
(5.1)
RPprod(i) =
λ
exp (
∑|Ntran|
j=1 pprod(j)
|Ntran|
− pprod(i)) + β
(5.2)
RF1cust(i) = κ ∗ (fcust(i) −
∑|Ntran|
j=1 fprod(j)
|Ntran| )
2 + 1 (5.3)
RF2cust(i) = exp (α ∗ (fcust(i) −
∑|Ntran|
j=1 fprod(j)
|Ntran| )) + 1 (5.4)
RF3cust(i) =
√√√√
exp (α ∗ (fcust(i) −
∑|Ntran|
j=1 fprod(j)
|Ntran| )) + 1 (5.5)
R-Rep is a lightweight model, since the complexity of computation is similar to
that of the trust model used by Taobao. Note that, the sums in formulae 5.2, 5.3,
5.4 and 5.5 can be calculated in advance, so they are regarded as constants in formula
5.1. RPprod(i) and RFcust(i) can be computed with complexity of O(1), hence, the time
complexity of R-Rep is O(n).
5.1.4 Experimental Results
In this section, two approaches are introduced to compare different trust models with
respect to robustness. The two approaches are generally applicable for any trust model
without any concrete restriction. Afterwards, the results of the comparison and the
corresponding statistics are shown.
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5.1.4.1 Comparing Different Models
We propose two approaches Ranking Comparison Index (RCI) and Benefit Variation
Ratio (BVR), to compare trust models regarding robustness given a set of suspicious
vendors. Both approaches share a criterion that, if the benefit which a set of “bad” ven-
dors achieve under one trust model, is less than the other, the first model is more robust
against manipulation than the second model. The advantage of the both approaches is
that the comparison procedure is independent of trust models per se.
For RCI, the ranking of a vendor is positively correlated to its potential benefit. The
higher the ranking, the more benefit a suspicious vendor will achieve. Therefore, RCI
measures the ranking variation of two trust models and compares them. The Ranking
Comparison Index (RCI) is defined in formula 5.6, where RK
(x)
i represents the ranking
of a vendor i calculated under model x, and SV denotes a set of suspicious vendors.
If trust model 1 is better than 2 in terms of resisting manipulation, RCI should be
larger than zero and vice versa. Given the assumption that the ranking of a vendor can
be modeled as an increasing function of its trust value, the validity of RCI is strongly
related to the two trust models. If the impact on resisting manipulative behavior for
one model is much larger than the other, the distance of rankings of the same vendor in
the two models will be very large. The set of suspicious vendors influences the validity
as well. In the extreme case, using a set of innocent vendors can generate the opposite
outcome.
RCI =
|SV |∑
i=1
RK
(1)
i −RK(2)i
min(RK
(1)
i , RK
(2)
i )
(5.6)
For BVR, the distribution of trust values is taken into consideration, where benefit
is proportional to trust value. When plotting the probability density function f(x) of
trust, it shows that most suspicious vendors have lower trust value, and very few suspi-
cious vendors have an extremely high value. The value of f(x) is inversely proportional
to x. Hence, we consider 1/f(x) as the measure of benefit which is proportional to its
corresponding trust value x. The probability density function (PDF) f(x) is fitted by
EasyFit1. Comparison of the fitting results shows two PDFs, the Dagum distribution
and Weibull distribution, which are comparable to the PDF generated from the data.
Their mathematical expressions are listed as formula 5.7 and 5.8, where α, β, γ and k
are the parameters.
fDagum(x) =
αk(x−γ
β
)αk−1
β(1 + (x−γ
β
)α)k+1
(5.7)
fWeibull(x) =
α
β
(
x− γ
β
)α−1exp(−(x− γ
β
)α) (5.8)
Formulae 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 define the main calculation steps, where BV (x)
stands for the benefit variation of suspicious vendors SV under model x; TB(x) stands
for the total quantity of benefit obtained by population under model x, and N denotes
1It is a distribution fitting software. www.mathwave.com
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the number of all the vendors; BV I stands for benefit variation index, which evaluates
the relative benefit variation of trust model 2, in the frame of reference of trust model
1; BV R stands for benefit variation ratio, which evaluates to what degree the benefit
obtained by the suspicious vendors is reduced using trust model 2 instead of trust model
1. TB(1)/TB(2) is the key factor, which transforms the benefit variation under trust
model 2 into that under trust model 1. This factor implies that, the quantities TB
measures under different models are the same, yet the scale is different from model to
model. It is possible to transform benefit variation under trust model a to trust model
b using the factor TB(b)/TB(a). Similar to the argument for RCI, the validity of BVR
is strongly related to the two trust models and the set of suspicious vendors.
BV (x) =
|SV |∑
i=1
1
fx(TM
(x)
i )
(5.9)
TB(x) =
N∑
i=1
1
fx(TM
(x)
i )
(5.10)
BV I = BV (2) ∗ TB(1)
TB(2)
(5.11)
BV R =
BV (1)−BV I
BV (1)
(5.12)
5.1.4.2 Results of Model Comparisons
In this section the results of comparing the trust models will be discussed. We will
restrict ourselves to two models, namely Taobao’s model and Beta Reputation System
(82), being compared to our models. Here is a short description of the trust models
involved in the experiment.
a) Taobao’s trust Model (TB). This is the baseline model.
b) Beta Reputation System (BRS). The trust value is calculated by formula 5.13,
where α stands for the number of positive ratings plus 1, and β denotes the number
of negative ratings plus 1. Neutral ratings are ignored.
TMbs =
α
α+ β
(5.13)
c) RT-FP-P. RT-FP-P encodes a version of R-Rep, in which both the frequency of
rating provisioning and the price of the product are considered. As formula 5.3
shows, the frequency factor is modeled as a Parabola function. In addition, λ is set
to 2, β to 1, and κ to 1. All the following models use the same value of parameters.
d) RT-P-P. In this model, only the factor price is considered.
e) RT-F-P. In this model, only the factor frequency is considered.
72
5.1 A Case Study for Online Shopping Services
Name SV3 SV3+SV4 SV3’ SV3’+SV4’
BRS -31 20 -26 -24
RT-FP-P 291 495 269 349
RT-FP-E 293 513 271 350
RT-FP-RE 292 474 271 349
RT-F-P 26 36 20 27
RT-P-P 287 437 266 345
Table 5.4: Robustness analysis by RCI
f) RT-FP-E. Formula 5.4 is used for trust calculation, and parameter α is set to 1.
g) RT-FP-RE. Formula 5.5 is used for trust calculation, and parameter α is set to 1.
We assume that the vendors who intend to promote their trust value are supposed
to have poor status of trust in the first place. We fit the correlation between trust value
and daily volume of sales regarding vendors in Fig 5.4 using linear regression. Based on
the third assumption (profit maximization), we are able to reduce SV3 and SV4 into
two even smaller sets SV3’ and SV4’ by filtering out the vendors who stay under the
regression line in Fig. 5.4. The control experiment compares the robustness against
manipulative behavior between Taobao’s model and the other six trust models using
both RCI and BVR.
Figure 5.4: Trust value vs. daily volume of sales regarding vendors
The result for RCI is shown in Table 5.4, where an entry represents the RCI of the
baseline model (TB) to the corresponding trust model. BS performs even worse than
TB for sets SV3, SV3’ and SV3’+SV4’. Due to the inferior performance, BS is not
involved in further discussion.
RT-FP-P, RT-FP-E and RT-FP-RE perform almost equally well. RT-P-P performs
slightly worse than the three models. RT-F-P is the worst model. The results indicate
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Name SV3 SV3+SV4 SV3’ SV3’+SV4’
RT-FP-P 10.625 11.303 4.326 4.722
RT-FP-E 11.635 12.871 4.650 5.125
RT-FP-RE 26.540 72.328 24.222 29.777
RT-F-P 8.832 9.411 4.014 4.388
RT-P-P 9.238 10.010 4.082 4.485
Table 5.5: Robustness analysis result of BVI (×105)
that the exponential function performs best in all the models, but there is little differ-
ence among the models which consider both price and frequency factors. Furthermore,
price plays a more important role in maintaining robustness than frequency. The main
reason that price is a discriminatory fact is that vendors can control the intensity of
manipulative behavior in order to avoid being captured by Taobao’s detection mecha-
nism. Thirdly, all the values of RCI are positive, and it shows that all the five models
perform much better than TB. The RCI value considering the suspicious set SV3+SV4
is larger than that of SV3 among R-Rep and its variations, and so is SV3’+SV4’ to
SV3’. We can easily calculate the RCI value of SV4 by subtracting that of SV3+SV4
by SV3. Therefore, all the five models work well on both SV3 and SV4. In addition,
the RCI considering SV3 is larger than that of SV3’ among all the models, and so is
SV3+SV4 to SV3’+SV4’. The difference implies the invalidity of the hypothesis that
the vendors who intend to promote their trust value initially have poor status.
The results for BVI and BVR are shown in Table 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. In Table
5.5, the number in the entry is the value of BVI divided by 105. It is not possible to
consider BS due to the characteristic of BS’s probability density function. There are
two facts shown in the table. The first one is that the BVI considering the suspicious
set SV3+SV4 is larger than that of SV3 among all the models, and so is SV3’+SV4’
to SV3’. The second one is that BVI considering suspicious set SV3 is larger than that
of SV3’ among all the models, and so is SV3+SV4 to SV3’+SV4’. The two facts are
exactly the same as in RCI, therefore the two comparison approaches RCI and BVI
show inherent consistency regarding robustness evaluation. BVR is shown in Table
5.6, in which the BVR indicates that, comparing to the Taobao’s trust model, to what
degree the benefit has been reduced by using the corresponding model. RT-FP-P,
RT-FP-E and RT-FP-RE perform almost equally well. RT-P-P does slightly worse.
RT-F-P is the worst model. This observation confirms the previous conclusion that,
RCI and BVR share inherent consistency regarding robustness evaluation.
5.1.4.3 Statistical Results
After the set of suspicious vendors and customers have been identified, we explore
the statistical characteristics of suspicious vendors and customers separately. In this
section, we focus on the information about the distribution of life span and trust grade.
Life span refers to how long a vendor or a customer stays in the system after initial
registration. Taobao discretizes trust value as trust grades, which is illustrated by Fig.
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Name SV3 SV3+SV4 SV3’ SV3’+SV4’
RT-FP-P 64.50% 97.07% 83.04% 92.62%
RT-FP-E 70.48% 97.56% 84.26% 93.14%
RT-FP-RE 69.13% 97.41% 84.00% 92.99%
RT-F-P 11.31% 81.28% 5.05% 53.45%
RT-P-P 61.12% 96.67% 81.77% 91.99%
Table 5.6: Robustness analysis result of BVR
5.5. The first grade ranges from 4 to 10, the second grade ranges from 11 to 40, and so
on. The trust model we use here is RT-FP-E, which has demonstrated to be the best
model in the previous section.
Figure 5.5: Trust grade in Taobao
a) Selecting model parameters. We choose the best combination of parameters for RT-
FP-E. Since the set of suspicious vendors is given, we are able to select the best
combination by calculating RCI. The evaluation results are listed in Table 5.7. The
results show that the best result comes from the last row which is written in bold.
However, the difference between different combinations is not very large. We argue
that, R-Rep is not a parameter-dependent trust model. This is one of the significant
properties for a good trust model, since TMS administrators don’t need to worry
about how to choose the right parameters. For generating the statistical analysis
results, only the best parameters are used.
b) Distribution of life span for vendors. In Fig. 5.6, the light color bar stands for the
suspicious vendors who are identified using only anonymous ratings (SV4); the dark
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λ β α RCI
2 1 1 190.23
2 1 0.5 188.46
2 1 2 192.08
1.5 0.5 1 190.47
1.5 0.5 0.5 188.45
1.5 0.5 2 192.00
3 2 1 190.49
3 2 0.5 188.44
3 2 2 192.09
Table 5.7: RCI results with different parameter settings
color bar denotes the ones who are identified using only non-anonymous ratings
(SV3); the sum of two bars, therefore, corresponds to the number considering both
SV3 and SV4. The distribution of SV3+SV4’s life span is close to an exponential
distribution; for SV3, without considering year eight, it can be approximated by
an exponential distribution. The shorter the life span, the more likely a vendor
behaves dishonestly in a non-anonymous manner. In addition, Fig. 5.7 indicates
the distribution of the 1081 vendors’ life spans. It is obvious that the life-span
distribution of suspicious vendors is different from the total vendor population. As
the figures demonstrate, most of the suspicious vendors have less than or equal to one
year’s life span. The trend of misbehavior expansion is obvious. The distribution and
the corresponding analysis show evidence for lack of efficient detection mechanisms
in the Taobao system.
Figure 5.6: Distribution of life span for suspicious vendors
c) Distribution of life span for customers. Following an analogous idea, the statistical
characteristics of suspicious customers with respect to life span is plotted in Fig. 5.8,
and that of the whole population indicated in Fig. 5.9. The two figures demonstrate
that, both distributions can be approximated by exponential distribution. The Fig
5.8 indicates that, the shorter the life span, the more likely a customer behaves
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Figure 5.9: Distribution of life span for all customers
Figure 5.10: Distribution of trust grade for all vendors
Figure 5.11: Distribution of trust grade for suspicious vendors
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trust grade is two that is shown in Fig. 5.12. This phenomenon indicates that
these suspicious customers misbehave not so obviously that they don’t have higher
trust grade. In order to maximize their profit, the attacker probably operates many
identities. This type of attack is called Sybil attack (89). A TMS is vulnerable to
Sybil attacks since in a computer network it is difficult to find the correspondence
between one person and his/her identities. Another explanation could be that there
are some dishonest customers who just begin to behave dishonestly, and with the
accumulation of transactions, their trust value will increase eventually.
Figure 5.12: Distribution of trust grade for suspicious customers
Figure 5.13: Distribution of trust grade for all customers
f) Results of temporal analysis. Due to the dynamics of a TMS, the state of the base
system is always changing. In order to capture the temporal impact of R-Rep on
the dataset, firstly we record RCI by month; this is shown in Fig 5.14. We have
a six-month rating history. The average RCI for 6 months with respect to SV3 is
around 200, 350 for SV4, and 550 for SV3+SV4. The average RCI indicates that
R-Rep performs better than the model used by Taobao during the whole six months.
Hence, R-Rep is able to suppress the rankings of a set of suspicious vendors over
time. However, for a single suspicious vendor it is not clear, whether he will also be
restricted by R-Rep. It might be the case that for some of the suspicious vendors
R-Rep works perfect but does not work for the other suspicious ones and in total
the positive effect of R-Rep still dominates. We choose a set of random samples
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5.2 A Case Study on a Travel-Related Service
In this section, we choose TripAdvisor1 as an example for a travel-related service. Tri-
pAdvisor (TA) contains, among other things, a large number of reviews about hotels.
We consider that manipulation can be attempted at three levels: at the rating level,
the rating provider level and the service level. A level refers to an aspect of informa-
tion from which manipulative behavior is observed. Features regarding manipulation
identification will be proposed for all the three levels. We propose two different ap-
proaches for identifying two types of manipulative behavior, promoting and demoting
(slandering). The first manipulation detection approach is an advanced clustering ap-
proach, suspicion degree meter (SDM), which is used to rank suspects with respect to
their (potential) manipulative behavior. SDM assigns two real numbers, the suspicion
index for promoting (SIP) and the suspicion index for demoting (SID), to each object
at the three levels. The second approach uses supervised learning for automatic de-
tection of suspicious behavior in a travel-related service. Three trust models are then
proposed. The first one is time-window-based, the second one is time-decay-based,
and the third one is suspicion-index-based. Finally the two detection approaches and
the three proposed trust models are evaluated. Annotations for supervised learning are
generated. Considering both unsupervised learning (SDM) and supervised learning, the
statistical characteristics of suspicious sub-populations and innocent sub-populations
are compared. Using the ranking comparison index (RCI) introduced in section 5.1.4,
all three types of proposed trust models are compared in terms of their robustness
against manipulative behavior.
5.2.1 Travel-Related Services and TripAdvisor.com
We define a travel-related service as a service which is provided for potential travellers,
searching for hotels, restaurants, flights, etc. In recent years many review websites,
e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp2, and Booking.com3, have gained success by integrating trust
into their websites. A reason for the success of these websites is that, trust acts as a
social catalyst which aids consumers to decrease the degree of uncertainty and the risk
of decision making. For instance, via a review website, a user can assess the trust in
hotels which are in the vicinity of their travel location before making a booking.
TripAdvisor.com is a travel website that assists customers in gathering travel infor-
mation, posting reviews and opinions of travel-related content and engaging in interac-
tive travel forums. We did not reuse the dataset in the previous studies (66), because
we find that the representativeness of a feature for identifying manipulation depends
on the characters of a dataset. For instance, a feature called “positive singleton” (66),
which refers to a positive review which is the only review posted by a reviewer, is a key
feature for detecting manipulation on TA. The dataset used in the previous study (66)
covers all 741 hotels and their corresponding reviews throughout Ireland. However, in
our dataset, the proportion of positive-singleton reviews is as small as 2.47% compared
1www.tripadvisor.com
2www.yelp.com
3www.booking.com
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Statistic NYC HNO
Duration 1999.1 - 2011.6 2000.6 - 2011.10
Hotels 420 344
Reviewers 110,128 14,681
Reviews 167,909 17,271
Contributions 770,644 115,160
Singletons 5,446 (3.24%) 426 (2.47%)
Table 5.8: Basic statistics of TA’s datasets
to 20% in the dataset which is used in the previous study (66). The reason might
be that manipulative behavior observed in different geographical regions is variable.
Therefore, one feature which is representative regarding detecting manipulation in one
dataset, might not be so useful in our dataset. Instead of using an existing dataset, we
collect two segments of data instead of one to act as a control against over-training.
New York City (NYC) is considered as one of the most ideal cities for travelling, and
there is a large number of hotels. We believe that it is more likely to find manipulative
behavior related to NYC than for other regions due to the keen competition among
hotels. Hanoi (HNO) is chosen as the second candidate because of a manipulation
report1, where it shows a request of writing fraudulent ratings for some hotel in Hanoi.
The basic statistics of the two datasets are listed in Table 5.8. Note that in the case of
TA’s datasets, the three categories: rating, rating provider and service, are referred to
as “review”, “reviewer” and “hotel” respectively.
5.2.2 Feature Identification
As was said before, there are three categories that are involved in manipulative behavior:
the review, the reviewer and the hotel. A service provider (e.g. a hotelier) may “hire”
reviewers either to give positive reviews to their hotel, or to give negative ones for
their competitors. We call the former case promoting manipulation and the latter case
demoting (slandering) manipulation. In the following, we introduce the features we use
for classification and clustering.
a) Advanced positive singleton (AdvPosSing), formalized by formula 5.14, is the
improved version of positive singleton (66). This feature is defined at the review
level for hoteliers to promote manipulation. In Wu’s definition of a positive singleton
(PS) (66), a positive review is one assigning four or five stars, and a review with fewer
than four stars is negative. This definition is arbitrary and could be inaccurate. For
instance, a latest four-star rating rti should be considered as negative if the previous
ratings are all five-star. Therefore, instead of using fixed values, we estimate the
difference between a latest rating and the current trust value of the hotel, i.e. the
average score at the moment when the rating is created. If a latest rating is a
1http://tripadvisorwatch.wordpress.com/2011/06/10/earn-money-writing-tripadvisor-reviews
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PS and the distance is larger than a threshold THp, we consider the rating as
positive, negative otherwise. In the experiment, we empirically set the threshold to
one. Following the same idea, an advanced negative singleton (AdvNegSing) is
specified for demoting manipulation likewise.
AdvPositiveSingleton(rti) =
{
1 if rti is PS and (r
t
i − TV t) > THp
0 Otherwise
(5.14)
b) Time interval between posted date and check-in date (TimePostedCheckin) refers
to the duration from the date the reviewer stayed in this hotel to the date a review is
posted. This feature is defined at the review level for both promoting and demoting
manipulation.
c) Time interval between consecutive contributions (Time Consec Contributions).
Contributions of a reviewer are ordered by the time a review is posted. The time in-
terval between two consecutive reviews can be regarded as a random variable. This
feature contains two parameters, mean (TimeConsecContributions MEAN)
and variance (TimeConsecContributions VAR) of the time interval variable.
The two parameters can be considered as two features for machine learning. They
are defined at the review level for both promoting and demoting manipulation.
d) Rating preference (RatingPreference), formalized by formula 5.15, is an indicator
for describing a reviewer’s attitude towards review provisioning. In formula 5.15,
SUBR() denotes a function whose inputs are the overall review score and the index
of the sub score, and the output is the value of the corresponding sub score. In TA
a review (rating) is composed of an overall score, a set of sub scores regarding hotel
features and a textual content. Both the overall score and the sub scores are encoded
as integers from one to five. In this section a review is equivalent to a rating. When
writing a review, a reviewer does not only give an overall score rti , but also sub
scores SUBR(rti , k) for value, rooms, location, cleanliness, service, etc. This feature
is defined at the review level for both promoting and demoting manipulation.
RatingPreference(rti) = r
t
i −
∑N
k=1 SUBR(r
t
i , k)
N
(5.15)
e) Turning day (TurningDay), demonstrated by Fig. 5.16, indicates the maximal
trust variation of a hotel. Each point in the figure represents a trust evaluation
with a certain time stamp. The cycle of evaluation is one month. We develop a
simple algorithm to identify the intervals which have the steepest positive and nega-
tive slopes TurningDay MAX and TurningDay MIN. These are the times where the
trust varies most rapidly. We specify TurningDay MAX as a feature for promot-
ing manipulation, and TurningDay MIN as a feature for demoting manipulation.
Furthermore, the logical relationships between hotel, reviewer and review are also
taken into consideration, since the variation comes from reviews and the reviewers
who provide them. TurningDay is defined at all levels and for both promoting and
demoting manipulation.
83
5. CASE STUDIES ON QUALITATIVE SERVICES
Figure 5.16: An illustration for the feature TurningDay
f) Inactive duration (InactiveDuration) refers to the duration between the last post
and the time when data is collected. This feature is defined at the reviewer level for
both promoting and demoting manipulation.
g) Contribution statistics (ContributionStatistics) contains the number of contri-
butions (ContributionNum), the arithmetic mean (Contribution MEAN) and
the variance (Contribution VAR) of contributions provided by a reviewer. All
three sub-features are defined at the reviewer level for both promoting and demot-
ing manipulation.
h) Consistency of ratings (ConsistencyRating), contains the variance of mode (
VAR MODE) and the variance of mean (VAR MEAN) with respect to different
types of reviews for a hotel. The idea behind this feature is to measure to what degree
different types of reviews are consistent with each other, and this feature is defined
at the hotel level for both promoting and demoting manipulation. First, we cate-
gorize reviews of a hotel by the categories of reviewer, such as “business”,“couples”
etc. Then we calculate mode and mean of these variables respectively. Finally,
the variance of mode and mean for each of the different categories of reviews are
calculated. Formula 5.16 shows the calculation of VAR MEAN. Rj denotes the set
of reviews for a hotel. SUBS() is a function which returns the subset of reviews
in terms of type k. MEAN and V AR are defined to evaluate mean and variance
respectively.
V AR MEAN(Rj) = V AR(MEAN(SUBS(Rj , k))) (5.16)
i) Average number of reviews per month (AveNumPerMonth) refers to the mean
number of reviews posted for a specific hotel in one month. This feature is defined
at the hotel level for both promoting and demoting cases.
j) Proportion of advanced positive singleton (PropAdvPosSing) refers to the pro-
portion of AdvPosSing and is defined at the hotel level for promoting manipulation.
The feature is adopted from Wu’s definition of “proportion of positive singletons”
(66). We only replace positive singleton by AdvPosSing. Parallel to this, proportion
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of advanced negative singleton (PropAdvNegSing) is defined in an analogous way
for demoting manipulation.
k) Reactive advanced positive singletons (ReactiveAdvPosSing) is adopted from
reactive positive singletons (66). In order to recover from negative reviews, the
management may react by posting some positive reviews. The strength of evidence
can be quantified as T − ti/T where T is the length of the entire time period, and ti
is the reaction time associated with a positive review i. This feature is formalized
by formula 5.17, where Th is a normalization factor for hotel h which is the elapsed
time between the 1st and the nth reaction positive singletons. This feature is defined
at the hotel level for promoting manipulation.
ReactiveAdvPositiveSingleton(h) =
1
|Th|(1−
n∏
i=1
(1− T − ti
T
)) (5.17)
l) Truncated positive rating (TruncPosRating) is adapted from the definition of
truncated rating (66). The idea is to remove a portion of the most positive reviews
for a hotel and recalculate the average to see if it deviates much from the original
value. In our evaluation, 20% most positive reviews are removed. TruncPosRating
is formalized by formula 5.18, where Rtrh is the truncated rating set. This feature is
defined at the hotel level for promoting manipulation. Analogous to this, the Trun-
cated Negative Rating (TruncNegRating) is defined for demoting manipulation.
TruncPositiveRating(h) =
1
|Rh|
∑
r∈Rh
r − 1|Rtrh |
∑
r∈Rtr
h
r (5.18)
m) Rating mean (Rating MEAN) refers to the mean of ratings for a hotel. This
feature is defined at the hotel level for both promoting and demoting manipulation.
n) Rating variance (Rating VAR) refers to the variance of ratings for a hotel. This
feature is defined at the hotel level for both promoting and demoting manipulation.
o) Ratio of room number to review number (RatioRoomReview) refers to the ratio
of the number of rooms in a given hotel to the number of reviews for the hotel.
The intuition is that it is suspicious for a hotel who owns only few rooms to have
a large number of reviews. This feature is defined at the hotel level for promoting
behaviour.
p) Hotel reviews contradiction degree (ContradictionDegree), formalized by formula
5.19, refers to the maximum variance of sub-ratings for a hotel. There are N sub-
ratings for each of the categories such as, value, rooms, location, cleanliness, service,
etc. MAX is a function to find the maximum variance. This feature is defined at
the hotel level for both promoting and demoting cases.
ContradictionDegree(h) =MAX({V AR(SUBS(rhi , k),where i = 1...N}) (5.19)
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q) Textual features (UniBigram) refers to the textual features extracted from the
review content. Like in (3, 67, 90), we use unigrams and bigrams representing the
review text by the amount of its words and consecutive word pairs.
5.2.3 Suspicion Degree Meter (SDM)
We propose an advanced clustering approach, suspicion degree meter (SDM), to identify
manipulative behavior (68). Manipulative behavior here refers to the operation of
injecting fraudulent reviews. Either a service provider (e.g., a hotelier or a restaurateur)
“hires” reviewers to post positive reviews for their own service, or negative ones for
competitors. In the case of promoting behavior, both high- and low-ranking hotels
have a potential motivation. High-ranking hotels intend to keep their superior position
in the ranking list, and low-ranking hotels simply want to promote their rank. In the
case of demoting behavior, usually the victim has a relatively high ranking. For the
design of SDM, we consider all three levels, review level, reviewer level and hotel level.
For each level, SDM uses two numbers, the suspicion index for promoting/demoting
(SIP/SID), for representing suspiciousness of an object with respect to the two types of
manipulative behavior. The two numbers are calculated by applying a fuzzy c-means
clustering algorithm (91). The basic idea of manipulation identification in each layer
is as follows. We assume that the numerical characteristic of a suspicious object is
distinguishable from that of a normal object. Hence, given the assumptions listed
below, it is possible to identify suspicious clusters by applying a clustering algorithm.
There are four basic assumptions for our dataset:
a) (AS1) If there is demoting manipulative behavior, usually inconsistencies between
reviews of a hotel can be observed in a short time interval.
b) (AS2) If there is manipulative behavior, a disturbance in temporal reputation eval-
uation can be observed.
c) (AS3) The more singletons, the more suspicious. A singleton refers to the review
provided by a reviewer, who only provides one review.
d) (AS4) If a reviewer tries to promote a hotel, their rating attitude tends to be
optimistic; if a reviewer tries to demote, their rating attitude tends to be pessimistic.
The four assumptions are the root of trust, and the SDM is built upon their validity.
AS1 states that inconsistency between reviews of a hotel appears when demoting ma-
nipulation takes effect. The motivation of demoting manipulation is to decline the trust
in a hotel which normally has a high trust value. Therefore we observe both positive
reviews and negative reviews. AS2 indicates that if there is manipulative behavior, an
abnormal variation can be observed in the time series of trust evaluation. AS3 states
that the feature singleton is a significant one. AS4 indicates that the polarity of a
reviewer’s rating attitude is reflected by considering the difference between the overall
rating score and the corresponding sub scores provided by a reviewer. When giving a
review, a reviewer not only gives an overall score but also scores for the dimensions
such as service, value, sleep quality, cleanliness, location, rooms, etc.
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Given a context of trust, it is possible to capture basic patterns of manipulation,
which are refined as basic assumptions or characteristics. All of the assumptions are
considered for manipulation identification, but different ones are assigned different
weights in terms of the specific context. Based on the assumptions, a robust reputation
model is generated, and different learning algorithms can be applied. In TripAdvisor,
we are following the four assumptions above.
When applying the fuzzy c-means algorithm on each level, each object (hotel, re-
viewer or review) is assigned two numbers in the range 0 to 1, representing SIP and
SID respectively. During the unsupervised learning process, the basic assumptions are
used to decide which clusters are more suspicious than the others. Moreover, the logical
relationship among different levels is utilized to adjust the initial suspicion indices (SIP
and SID) which are calculated by fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm. In our case study,
the suspicion indices for reviews are used to adjust the suspicion indices for reviewers
and hotels. There are two logical relations being taken into consideration. First, a
hotel’s suspicion index depends on the corresponding reviews. Second, a reviewer’s
suspicion index depends on the corresponding reviews. Yet, one should not assume
that the suspicion index of a hotel depends on the reviewers who provide reviews to
the hotel, because a suspicious reviewer may only write fraudulent reviews for some
target hotel, but behave “normally” in other cases. Following those lines of thought, we
develop two operations to adjust the suspicion index (SI) for reviewers and hotels by
considering the SI of reviews. Here the SI represents either PID or SID. Formula 5.20
is used to adjust SI at the reviewer level. SIRWR1×n represents the old SI vector regarding
reviewers, in which there are n reviewers in system; SI
′RWR
1×n represents the new SI
vector regarding reviewers. SIRE1×n represents the SI vector regarding reviews. RRm×n
represents a relationship matrix between reviews and reviewers. An entry rrij is equal
to one, if a reviewer j posts a review i. α is the weight given to the old SI vector. A
suspicion degree vector derived from reviews is given weight 1−α. ⊗ is an aggregation
factor, which maps the SIs of corresponding reviews of a reviewer into one value. For
the dataset in TA, it is implemented as a MAX function, which returns the maximal
value. We use a MAX function instead of a AVG function which calculates arithmetic
average, since a reviewer can only take action on the target and behave normally oth-
erwise. Formula 5.21 is used to adjust SI at the hotel level. SIHT1×n represents the old
SI vector regarding hotels, in which there are p hotels in system. RHm×p represents a
relationship matrix between reviews and hotels. An entry rhij is equal to one, if there
is a review i of a hotel j. In formula 5.21, the aggregation factor is implemented as an
AVG function. Since the suspicion degree of a hotel can be measured by the average of
suspicion degree of the reviews which are related to the hotel.
SI
′RWR
1×n = α ∗ SIRWR1×n + (1− α) ∗ SIRE1×m ⊗RRm×n (5.20)
SI
′HT
1×p = β ∗ SIHT1×p + (1− β) ∗ SIRE1×m ⊗RHm×p (5.21)
One of the main tasks is to find suspicious candidates at review, reviewer and hotel
levels. Once SIP and SID are calculated via the SDM, we can rank objects by their
SIs, and make a final decision based on that. The SID of reviews in New York City
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is plotted in Fig. 5.17. The plot looks like the character “L”, which means, there is
a small number of reviews having much higher SI than the rest of the reviews. We
choose the points on the left-hand side as the candidates of suspicious reviews, because
these reviews have higher SID value than the others. For the reviewer level, which is
illustrated in Fig. 5.18, the data can be fitted by an exponential function. In this case,
we simply choose a threshold for SI (e.g. 0.7) or top ranking (e.g. 10%) to identify the
most suspicious group. The choice of threshold depends on various factors, such as the
characteristic of the dataset, the shape of the plot, expert’s opinion, etc. It is up to the
analyzer to make the decision which threshold to choose. In the experiment different
thresholds are chosen, depending on the level and the type of manipulation.
Figure 5.17: SID of reviews in New York City
Figure 5.18: SIP of reviewers in New York City
5.2.4 Proposed Trust Models
The basic idea of evaluating trust is to calculate the trust value via aggregating pieces
of evidence (reviews) in terms of giving different weights to different types of evidence.
In order to build a good trust model for resisting manipulative behavior in TripAdvisor,
two factors are considered. The first factor is time. On the one hand, since the trust
of a travel-related service varies over time, it is unnecessary to consider reviews several
years ago to be as important as more recent reviews. On the other hand, if there are
fraudulent reviews in the past, it is a good idea to weaken them by a time window
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or time decay factor. We apply both time-window-based and exponential-decay-based
approaches. The second factor is the suspicion index (SI), which was introduced in
section 5.2.3. Formula 5.22 represents a time-window-based trust model, where ts
denotes the time when trust is evaluated; tw stands for a time interval and only reviews
within this interval are considered. TW () is a function which returns 1 if the time stamp
t of a review is within the interval tw; otherwise it returns 0. The exponential-decay-
based trust model is implemented by formula 5.23, where λ is a negative real number.
Rep TW (ts, tw) =
∑Ntw
i=1,t<ts r
t
i ∗ TW (tw, t)
Ntw
(5.22)
Rep EXP (ts) =
∑N
i=1,t<ts r
t
i ∗ e(λt)
N
(5.23)
Formulae 5.24, 5.25 and 5.26 formalize a SI-based trust model designed to resist
manipulation, where wrei represents the weight assigned to a review and w
rwr
i to the
corresponding reviewer. For resisting promoting manipulation, the weight is imple-
mented by an exponential function, which has one special point (SIP rwrmin , 1) at the
reviewer level or (SIP remin, 1) at the review level. SIP
rwr
min denotes the smallest SIP
among reviewers. In order to discount the effect of suspicious reviews and reviewers
regarding demoting, a linear function is used.
Rep SIP (ts) =
∑N
i=1,t<ts r
t
i ∗ wrwri ∗ wrei
N
(5.24)
wrwri =
{
e(γ∗(SIP
rwr
i −SIP
rwr
min)) Promoting
α ∗ SISrwri + β Demoting
(5.25)
wrei =
{
e(γ∗(SIP
re
i −SIP
re
min)) Promoting
α ∗ SISrei + β Demoting
(5.26)
5.2.5 Experimental Results for Unsupervised Learning
5.2.5.1 Statistical Characteristics of Suspects
Given sets of suspects at the levels of review, reviews and hotel, respectively, we inves-
tigate the statistical characteristics of suspects and of the rest of population. As we
have mentioned in section 5.2.3, the validity of labeling a review largely depends on
the trustworthiness of feedback or review helpfulness (75). Review helpfulness refers to
the number of positive feedback from other users to a review. For instance if there are
10 out of some people giving “thumbs-up” in TripAdvisor, then the review helpfulness
is equal to 10. Here we investigate the (uncertain) assumption that review helpfulness
indicates the trustworthiness of a review. Fig. 5.19 shows the distribution of review
helpfulness in New York City. A promoting group is generated by choosing the most
suspicious reviews with respect to promoting manipulation, and a demoting group is
generated in an analogous fashion. The rest of the reviews are considered the innocent
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group. The horizontal axis represents review helpfulness of a review plus one, since
in a log-log plot there is no zero on the horizontal axis. More than 99.9% of reviews
for each group have zero review helpfulness. However, innocent reviews obtain much
more review helpfulness than suspicious reviews in NYC. The reviews which obtain the
highest review helpfulness are all considered innocent. It seems that, using review help-
fulness to measure trustworthiness of reviews is a valid idea. Yet, the result in Fig. 5.20
gives us a counterexample, which shows the distribution of review helpfulness in Hanoi.
Every group shows a power law distribution. More important, for both promoting and
demoting groups, there are many reviews with a large review helpfulness score. For
instance, there is one review which is suspicious in terms of demoting manipulation.
This review has a helpfulness score of 68, which is extremely large. Since there are so
many suspicious reviews which have relatively large number of review helpfulness, it is
not reasonable to measure trustworthiness of a review using review helpfulness.
Figure 5.19: Distribution for review helpfulness in New York City
Figure 5.20: Distribution for review helpfulness in Hanoi
Table 5.9 shows the mean and standard deviation of reviewer helpfulness from
different subpopulations. Reviewer helpfulness is defined as sum of all the review
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Statistic Promoting Demoting Rest Dataset
Mean 2.35 1.39 0.72 NYC
Standard Deviation 3.90 3.28 2.07 NYC
Mean 1.90 2.26 0.84 HNO
Standard Deviation 8.54 5.21 3.14 HNO
Table 5.9: Statistics for reviewer helpfulness
helpfulness of reviews, which are posted by this reviewer. The table shows that, for both
New York City and Hanoi, the mean of reviewer helpfulness for suspicious reviewers is
higher than the normal reviewers. The reason may be that most of “bad” reviewers
post fraudulent reviews which can mislead a normal user judgment, or most of the
reviewer helpfulness is provided by conspirators. It is possible to investigate the exact
reason by considering information such as the IP address of every positive and negative
feedback to a review.
The distribution of review scores, grouped by travel types is shown in Figs. 5.21 and
5.22. The horizontal axis represents the five travel types, business, couples, family, solo
and friends. The vertical axis represents the proportion of the population. Different
groups are color coded, red for the promoting group; green for the demoting group;
blue represents the innocent group. Figs. 5.21 and 5.22 show that the distributions are
almost the same regardless of different groups. The distributions with similar shape
imply that, manipulative behavior is not spontaneous but well organized to maximize
profit.
Moreover, the rating distribution for different groups is given in Figs. 5.23 and 5.24.
The horizontal axis represents the rating scale from one to five, and the vertical axis
stands for proportion of the population. Blue is the promoting group, which denotes the
subpopulation of suspicious reviewers for promoting; green is the demoting group; red
represents the innocent group. Fig. 5.23 shows in New York City suspicious reviewers
for promoting give ratings of four or five stars in most cases. However, suspicious
reviewers for demoting do not rate one or two star(s) only, but also give a large number
of five stars ratings. This is probably due to suspicious reviewers attempting to avoid
the TripAdvisor’s detection mechanism by injecting some random positive reviews.
Another explanation is that, one user account is used for both promoting and demoting
operation in order to maximize profit. In Fig. 5.24 which indicates the case in Hanoi,
the suspects for promoting behave so extremely that almost all the ratings are five
stars. This phenomenon shows that manipulative behavior is handled differently in
different regions. The manipulation detection strength imposed on Hanoi is so weak
that the suspicious reviewers for promoting do not need to post any review less than
five in order to avoid from be detected out by TripAdvisor.
5.2.5.2 Trust Model Comparison
Given a set of suspicious hotels, different trust models are compared using RCI which
was introduced in section 5.1.4. We have two options to choose a baseline trust model.
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Figure 5.21: Review distribution for types of travel in New York City
Figure 5.22: Review distribution for types of travel in Hanoi
Figure 5.23: The distribution of ratings in New York City
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Annotated Object Number
Number of Genuine Reviews 180
Number of Promoting Reviews 139
Number of Demoting Reviews 24
Number of Genuine Reviewers 390
Number of Promoting Reviewers 131
Number of Demoting Reviewers 20
Number of Genuine Hotels 43
Number of Promoting Hotels 26
Number of Demoting Hotels 2
Table 5.11: Annotations statistics
5.2.6 Results for Supervised Learning of Manipulative Behavior
As we mentioned in subsection 5.2.3, supervised learning is difficult to perform due
to the problem of data annotation. It is difficult to generate a gold-standard training
data. In this section, we enhance the data annotation and generate training data.
Based on the training data, a classifier is trained and the statistical characteristics of
manipulative behavior is analyzed and discussed.
5.2.6.1 Annotations
Since we apply classic supervised learning approaches, having properly labeled data is
the most significant part in our work. Before describing the annotation process, we have
some comments on the previous work (67). Ott et al. used Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) to generate fraudulent reviews (67) and they mix fraudulent reviews with real
reviews which are considered to be written by honest reviewers in TripAdvisor. Then
human annotators are required to identify the fraudulent reviews from the mixture.
One of the main findings of the experiment is that humans are inefficient at identifying
fraudulent reviews. We agree with the finding that humans are inefficient, yet we argue
that the idea of generating fraudulent reviews using AMT has its own limit. It is
unclear whether the characteristic of fraudulent reviews written by virtual workers on
AMT is similar to that in TripAdvisor1. Furthermore, the annotators make a decision
based on the review text only (67). A better solution is to identify fraudulent reviews
which are extracted from a dataset using all available complimentary information given,
for example, checking various reviews from the same reviewer or the date they were
posted. We assume that if the annotation process is carefully handled, an appropriate
gold standard can be manually generated.
We select three well-trained and independent annotators. Well-trained means every
annotator has at least a basic notion of manipulative behavior. They are encouraged to
evaluate each review by identifying logical inconsistency within the information which
1http://tripadvisorwatch.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/tripadvisor-pay-review-fake
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is related to a review. The information does not only refer to the numerical and textual
value of a review per se, but all types of information about the corresponding reviewer,
such as uploaded pictures, reviewer profile etc. The annotators make their decisions
on facts like one uploaded picture was the only one looking quite different from the
pictures uploaded by other reviewers. We randomly pick 1000 reviews from the dataset
in New York City only, whose overall score is either one or five star(s), and let all of the
annotators evaluate the same 1000 reviews separately. We believe that a review with
the lowest or highest score is most likely to be suspicious. The annotation process is a
very time-consuming procedure, since an annotator has to check a lot of information in
order to make a decision. Moreover, we calculate the inter-annotation agreement using
the Fleiss’ Kappa, which is κ = 0.18. This indicates only slight agreement, which is
consistent with the findings (67). To provide reliable labels, we chose only those reviews
for our final gold standard that were unanimously labeled by all three annotators. Thus
having a complete agreement level and considering the fact that our annotators made
use of all information provided about the review, the reviewer and the hotel, we assume
the labels in the gold standard to constitute the truth.
So far, only reviews are labeled, but we still need to label reviewers and hotels.
Considering logical relations among different object levels, a set of labeled suspicious
reviewers and hotels can be generated from labeled reviews. There are two logical
arguments that we use. If a review is suspicious, the corresponding reviewer is also
suspicious; if a number of reviews posted about a hotel are all suspicious, the hotel is
also suspicious. Following this idea, the sets of suspicious reviewers and hotels are gen-
erated. In addition, in our previous work, we succeeded in assigning a Suspicion Index
(SI) to the objects at review, reviewer and hotel levels (68). Fig. 5.17 demonstrates
the distribution of the SI at the reviewer level with respect to promoting manipulation.
The data can be fitted by an exponential function. In this case, we simply set a thresh-
old for SI (e.g. 0.01) to choose a set of genuine reviewers with respect to promoting
manipulation. The statistics of annotated objects is listed in Table 5.11.
5.2.6.2 Feature Evaluation
To illustrate the effectiveness of the features introduced in section 5.2.2, we plot the
distribution of feature values with respect to genuine and suspicious objects considering
the gold standard annotations. In this section, we sample the two most representative
features.
The average number of reviews per month (AveNumPerMonth) is one of the most
representative features specified at the hotel level. The value distribution of AveNumPer-
Month is plotted in Fig. 5.29. All hotels are ordered by their AveNumPerMonth value,
which is represented on the y-axis. The x-axis corresponds to the indices of the hotels.
There are three groups of hotels: those with genuine reviews (innocent group), those
with promoting reviews (promoting group) and those with demoting reviews (demot-
ing group). The values of the demoting group clearly differ from those of the genuine
group. Comparing the promoting group to the genuine group, all of the hotels whose
AveNumPerMonth is greater than 15 are suspicious. This numerical characteristic can
be captured by supervised learning.
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Figure 5.29: Average number of reviews per month
Contribution mean is a feature specified at the reviewer level. Its value distribution
is plotted in Fig. 5.30. On the x-axis, there are five intervals and each represents a
range of values. The y-axis denotes the percentage of reviewers whose feature value
falls into this range. Fig. 5.30 shows the fact that the range of contribution mean of
the genuine group is in the range four to five (four is exclusive), which is determined
by the way we generate the labels for genuine reviewers in the annotation process.
Contribution mean of the promoting group is mostly distributed in the range four to
five (four is exclusive), whereas that of the demoting group is distributed in the range
zero to four (zero is exclusive). Again, boundaries among the different groups can be
learned.
5.2.6.3 Learning Results
The main learning results are shown in Table 5.12. For machine learning, we use
the toolkit Weka1. Due to the experience of previous work (62, 67), several classic
supervised learning approaches are applied, such as a linear logistic regression model,
SVMs and a Naive Bayes classifier. Since SVMs clearly outperform other classifiers
in our evaluation, we only show the classification results regarding SVMs. Achieving
accuracies above 90%, identifying manipulative behavior at hotel and reviewer level
seems to work well. Especially demoting manipulation could be detected correctly in
all cases.
However, the classification results at the review level are not as good as we expected.
All the scores, accuracy, precision, recall and F-score, are much lower than those at the
reviewer and hotel level. Although the accuracies ranging between 65% and 84% do
not seem to be that low, the actual performance for detecting fraudulent reviews has
an f-measure as low as 13% for demoting behavior. Comparing non-textual features
and textual features, the latter ones clearly outperform non-textual features especially
regarding demoting manipulation classification. We draw the conclusion that it is
extremely difficult to identify fraudulent reviews. More representative features for
1www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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Figure 5.30: Contribution mean
Genuine Fraudulent
Types Features A P R F P R F
HotelPMB Non-Textual 91.3% 100% 87.8% 93.5% 76.9% 100% 87%
HotelDMB Non-Textual 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ReviewerPMB Non-Textual 96.4% 100% 95.4% 97.6% 85.5% 100% 92.2%
ReviewerDMB Non-Textual 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ReviewPMB Non-Textual 65.2% 71.1% 68.4% 69.8% 57.6% 60.6% 59%
ReviewPMB UniBigram 68.3% 76.7% 70.1% 73.2% 57.6% 65.6% 61.3%
ReviewDMB Non-Textual 80.4% 89.4% 88.5% 89% 14.3% 13.6% 13%
ReviewDMB UniBigram 84.3% 90% 92% 91% 41.7% 35.7% 38.5%
Table 5.12: Classification Results, where PMB for Promoting Manipulative Behavior,
DMB for Demoting Manipulative Behavior, A for Accuracy, P for Precision, R for Recall
and F for F-Score (3). UniBigram denotes both Unigram and Bigram are considered during
learning process. Non-textual denotes all the corresponding features described in section
3.
identifying suspicious reviews need to be developed. In the following section, we will
focus on the results at the reviewer and hotel level only.
5.2.6.4 Feature Selection
In this section, we explore the performance of the features. Given human annotations,
features are ranked by the weight assigned by the SVMs (93). Table 5.13 shows the
top five features for suspicious hotel classification. As we expected, average number
of reviews per month (AveNumPerMonth) is the best feature for identifying promot-
ing manipulation, and the second best for identifying demoting manipulation. A hotel
suffering from demoting manipulation usually has a large value for AveNumPerMonth,
since in order to recover from slandering, the hotels “hire” reviewers to give fraud-
ulent positive reviews. The singleton related features such as PropAdvPosSing and
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Ranking Featurespromoting Featuresdemoting
1 AveNumPerMonth Rating VAR
2 Rating VAR AveNumPerMonth
3 RatioRoomReview PropAdvNegSing
4 TurningDay Rating MEAN
5 PropAdvPosSing VAR MODE
Table 5.13: Top 5 features at the hotel level
Ranking Featurespromoting Featuresdemoting
1 Contribution MEAN Contribution MEAN
2 InactiveDuration ContributionVAR
3 ContributionVAR ContributionNum
4 TurningDay InactiveDuration
5 ContributionNum TimeConsecContributions MEAN
Table 5.14: Top 5 features at the reviewer level
PropAdvNegSing are shown in the list as well.
Table 5.14 shows the top five features for suspicious reviewer classification. As we
expected, Contribution mean (Contribution MEAN) is the top rank for both promoting
and demoting manipulation. Inactive duration (InactiveDuration) is ranked second for
promoting manipulation detection, since providing a singleton review usually implies a
large value for InactiveDuration. Contribution variation (ContributionVAR) is ranked
third for promotion manipulation and second for demoting manipulation.
5.2.6.5 Statistical Characteristics of Suspects
In this section, we investigate uncertain assumptions and explore statistical character-
istics of suspects by considering the predictions made by our trained classifiers.
In section 5.2.2, we specify hotel reviews contradiction degree with the expectation
that the larger the Hotel reviews contradiction degree a hotel has, the more suspicious
the hotel is. Applying the same approach for feature evaluation, we plot the hotel re-
views contradiction degree distribution for both promoting and demoting manipulation
in Fig. 5.31 and 5.32. Hotels are ranked by their Hotel reviews contradiction degree
value. The two figures show that the Hotel reviews contradiction degree the suspicious
and the genuine groups completely overlap. This result rejects the validity of Hotel
reviews contradiction degree as a representative feature. Hotel reviews contradiction
degree is not very useful feature for detection of manipulation.
O’Mahony considers the helpfulness of a review as a representative feature for eval-
uating the trustworthiness of a review (75). We cannot evaluate this hypothesis at the
review level where we do not have a good classifier. However, we can still learn some
similar notion at the reviewer level where we have qualified classifiers. The helpfulness
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Figure 5.31: Hotel reviews contradiction degree evaluation result for promoting behavior
Figure 5.32: Hotel reviews contradiction degree evaluation result for demoting behavior
Figure 5.33: Reviewer helpfulness distribution
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of a reviewer is equal to the sum of helpfulness of all the reviews which are provided by
the reviewer. Fig. 5.33 shows the distribution of helpfulness of reviewers with respect
to the different groups. In the dotted circle area, the helpfulness of the promoting
group is much larger than that of the genuine group. This is an indirect evidence to
reject the hypothesis that the more reviewer helpfulness, the less suspicious regarding
manipulation.
Figure 5.34: Rating distribution for promoting behavior
We also explore the statistical characteristics of the whole population. After having
learned good classifiers at both reviewer and hotel levels, we generate the predictions
at the two levels considering all the reviewers and hotels. One of the most important
questions is what the rating distribution looks like with respect to different groups of
reviewers. Do reviewers who try to promote a hotel always give five stars? Similarly,
do reviewers who try to demote a hotel always give the lowest rating? The results
are shown in Fig. 5.34 and 5.35. From Fig. 5.34 we can see that, genuine reviewers
provide mostly four or five stars, whereas promoting reviewers provide all from one
to five star(s). The proportion of one or two points given by promoting reviewers
is much larger than that given by genuine reviewers. This phenomenon implies that
reviewers who intend to promote a hotel provide more negative ratings than honest
reviewers, which is a very counterintuitive result. A reasonable explanation is that
diversity of review provisioning is a strategy for promoters to avoid being identified
by TA’s manipulation detection algorithm. An alternative explanation is that in order
to maximize profit, a reviewer provides both positive and negative fraudulent reviews.
In the case of demoting, which is plotted in Fig. 5.35, reviewers do not only provide
negative fraudulent reviews but positive reviews as well. The explanation is similar as
before. Another important result that we can derive from the two figures is that, most
of the negative reviews are fraudulent. As you can see, few genuine reviewers give one
star or two stars rating.
Regarding the ranking of hotels in terms of trust value, the ranking distribution of
different groups is shown in Fig. 5.36. Three groups are extracted from the prediction
which is generated by the trained classifiers. The promotion group refers to the set of
suspicious hotels which are predicted to be related to promoting manipulative behavior;
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Figure 5.35: Rating distribution for demoting behavior
the demotion group refers to the set of suspicious hotels which are predicted to be
related to demoting manipulative behavior; the both group is the intersection of the
first two groups. The x-axis represents 10 intervals in which hotels fall in terms of
their ranking. For instance, the top 10% ranked hotels fall into the first interval and
so on. The y-axis denotes the number of suspicious hotels which fall into an interval.
Fig. 5.36 shows that manipulation appears in all intervals and promoting manipulation
is much more popular than demoting manipulation. Note that this result is derived
from TA, which probably already applied manipulation detection mechanisms. Even
considering TA applying manipulation detection, there are still many suspects existing
in the system. Another fact is that most suspicious hotels suffering from demoting
manipulation are also related to promoting manipulation. It seems that promoting
behavior is triggered by demoting behavior, since in order to recover from demoting
behavior, hotels “hire” reviewers to provide fraudulent positive reviews.
In this section, datasets from New York City and Hanoi are collected. Both the
unsupervised learning approach namely suspicion degree meter (SDM) and the super-
vised learning namely classification approach are applied for identifying promoting and
demoting manipulation.
Following the basic assumptions AS1 to AS4, SDM can detect sets of suspects at
different levels: the review, the reviewer and the hotel level. Given sets of suspects,
statistical characteristics of suspicious group and innocent group are compared for each
level. The assumption that review helpfulness can be used to calculate the trustworthi-
ness of reviews is not valid in the dataset HNO. The unbalanced manipulation detection
force imposed by TripAdvisor in different regions (e.g. NYC and HNO) is shown. Fur-
thermore, given a set of suspicious hotels, different reputation models are compared via
RCI. The results show that, superiority of reputation model is dependent on the choice
of model parameters and feature of dataset per se. Although there is not a universal
reputation model which fits best for every circumstance, given a set of suspects in all
the layers identified by SDM, local optimization can be achieved.
For supervised learning, annotations regarding review, reviewer and hotel levels are
generated by unanimous voting and the results from SDM. Using the annotations and
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Figure 5.36: Trust ranking distribution for hotels
SVM, classifiers are learned using Weka. Results show that we are able to learn good
classifiers for layers of reviewer and hotel, but not for layer of review even considering
both non-textual and textual features. The rating distribution with respect to different
groups, genuine, promoting and demoting groups, shows that suspicious reviewers pro-
vide reviews with a large variation. The reason could be either a suspicious reviewer
provides both fraudulent positive and negative reviews in order to maximize profit,
or he/her does this for avoiding from being detected by TripAdvisor’s manipulation
detection mechanism.
5.3 A Case Study on Lifestyle-Related Services
In this section we choose Dianping.com1 as an example of a platform where lifestyle-
related services are widely reviewed and discussed. Dianping is a Chinese rating plat-
form, where people can post their reviews on any lifestyle-related service. Unfortunately
it has been pointed out that there are a lot of suspicious reviewers who post fraudulent
reviews2. In order to identify suspicious reviewers and the corresponding fraudulent
reviews on reviewing websites like Dianping.com, the features with respect to review-
ers are specified. We propose an advanced clustering approach, Annotation-Auxiliary
Clustering (AAClust), to identify reviewers suspected of manipulation. In order to
extend our knowledge of manipulation identification, we analyze social network infor-
mation for innocent and suspicious reviewers. The knowledge could be used to enhance
our machine learning process.
1www.dianping.com
2www.sootoo.com/content/398411.shtml
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5.3.1 Lifestyle-Related Services and Dianping.com
A lifestyle-related service is an oﬄine service which could be used in daily life, such as
a restaurant, caf, bar, shopping, doctor, lawyer, etc. Lifestyle -related services cover
a large spectrum of services and the evaluation of a lifestyle-related service is highly
subjective. A restaurant is a typical example, since different people prefer different
cuisines. In Dianping, there is a variety of categories of lifestyle-related service such as
restaurant, shopping, doctor, etc. In every category, there are hundreds of instances
of service on which a reviewer can post reviews. For example, a reviewer can post a
review on a restaurant in Beijing named “See You Next Time”. A review is composed
of a total score, some sub-scores and a comment. A score is a number ranged from one
to five. The specification of categories of sub-scores depends on the type of service.
For a restaurant, the categories of sub-scores are the taste, the environment and the
service. For another service, the specification of categories can be different. In addition,
Dianping provides some social networking features. A reviewer can make friends and
keep a friend list in Dianping. A reviewer can send a flower to another reviewer in
order to present a sense of complement to the reviewer who posts a nice review.
Figure 5.37: Number of reviewers vs. out-degree
Reviewer information is collected as follows. Since the whole reviewer population
is large, the first question is which subset of reviewers to select. Due to the social
networking feature in Dianping, the relationships among reviewers in Dianping can be
regarded as a graph. Crawling large, complex graphs like Dianping presents a challenge.
In order to explore the social network information among reviewers, we should collect
a subset of reviewers who keep the original social network structure such as weakly
connected component(WCC)1. Breadth-first search (BFS) can help us to collect such a
subset (94). The collection of the subset started from a power node which is a reviewer
who posted over 1000 reviews and has more than 500 friends. In each step, we retrieve
the list of friends for a reviewer is retrieved we had not yet visited and add the retrieved
reviewers to the list of reviewers. Finally we collect 380,489 reviewers and 1,471,610
1A weakly connected component in a directed graph is a set of nodes where each node in the set
has a path to every other node in the set if all links are viewed as undirected.
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Object Size
COLLECTED
Reviewers 380,489
Friendship relation 1,471,610
SELECTED (20%)
Reviewers 78,378
Friendship relation 104,924
Flower relation 1,053,759
Table 5.15: Statistics of the Dianping.com dataset
friendship relations. The distribution of the out-degree of reviewers is plotted in Fig.
5.37. The out-degree of a reviewer refers to the number of their friends. As one can
see, the distribution follows a power law.
We put all the 380,489 reviewers into bins which correspond to different out-degrees.
For each bin, we randomly choose a subset of 20% (78,378) of reviewers from all the
reviewers. We collect information such as the posted reviews, number of received
flowers, number of uploaded pictures, gender, city, etc. for each reviewer. The basic
statistics of our dataset are given in Table 5.15.
5.3.2 Feature Identification
We specify the following features of a reviewer as input data for the subsequent phase
of machine learning:
• Gender: There are three options: male, female and N/A. N/A is the default when
the reviewer does not provide the information.
• Number of reviews. This is the total number of reviews posted by the reviewer.
• Wish list: This is the list of service providers preferred by the reviewer. For
instance, a reviewer might keep a list of favorite restaurants as a wish list.
• Number of uploaded pictures: This is the total number of pictures uploaded by
the reviewer. The pictures could be personal photos, photos of a restaurant, or
whatever.
• Number of recommendations: A recommendation refers to a list of recommended
service providers posted by the reviewer. Here we count the total number of such
recommendations.
• Number of friends: This is the reviewer’s out-degree.
• Forum activity degree: This is the total number of posts the reviewer has made
in the Dianping.com forum.
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• Contribution: This is a value indicating the contribution a reviewer delivers in
Dianping. The main factors are posted reviews, uploaded pictures, recommenda-
tions, manipulative behavior, and personal profile completeness. Contribution is
calculated by Dianping, note that contribution could decrease due to identifica-
tion of manipulative behavior. Contribution can be regarded as an internal trust
value in Dianping.
• Number of badges: This is the number of badges which a reviewer receives. For
instance if a reviewer posts a certain amount of reviews for a service such as
hotpot restaurants, the reviewer will receive a special badge for that. Here we
count the number of badges held by the reviewer, thus measuring his level of
activity in Dianping.
• Number of received flowers: This is the total number of flowers received by the
reviewer. Number of updated activities: It refers to the number of recent actions
of the reviewer such as a new posted review, a new recommendation, etc. This
number measures his current level of activity.
• Inactive duration: It is the elapsed time between the reviewer’s initial registration
and the last login time.
• Life span: It is the time interval between registration and the last login time.
• Number of replies: Total number of replies made by other users to any of the
reviews posted by the reviewer.
• Average number of replies: Average number of replies made by other users to any
of the reviews posted by the reviewer.
• Number of flowers received per review: Total number of flowers received per
review posted by the reviewer.
• Average number of flowers received per review: Average number of flowers re-
ceived per review posted by the reviewer.
• Average words per review: Average number of words per review posted by the
reviewer.
• Maximum number of reviews: Maximum number of reviews posted by the re-
viewer within different time intervals. We consider the interval to be daily,
monthly and annual, respectively. Thus we have three parameters: Maximum
number of reviews per day, maximum number of reviews per month, and maxi-
mum number of reviews per year.
• Minimum number of reviews: Minimum number of reviews posted by the reviewer
within different time intervals. Following the pattern described above, we get
three parameters: Minimum number of reviews per day, minimum number of
reviews per month, and minimum number of reviews per year.
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We illustrate the process of AAClust in Fig. 5.38. First, we apply a classic clustering
algorithm such as K-means1. We assume that all the objects, including annotated
objects, are clustered into three clusters, C1, C2 and C3. For Dianping, an object
refers to a reviewer. The reviewers that are annotated as suspicious or innocent fall
into clusters as shown in Fig. 5.38. We define a ratio rati, which is given by formula
5.27, as an extra label for each cluster. N susi stands for the number of suspicious
reviewers in cluster i; N inni stands for the number of innocent reviewers in cluster
i. Therefore, ratC1 = 5/2, ratC2 = 1 and ratC3 = 3. We set a threshold thratio for
identifying the labelled clusters with high confidence. The manipulative behavior status
of the reviewers in the rest of the clusters is unknown.
rati =


0 if N susi = N
inn
i = 0
Nsusi
N inni
if N susi ≥ N inni and N inni > 0
+∞ if N susi ≥ N inni and N inni = 0
N inni
Nsusi
if N susi < N
inn
i and N
sus
i > 0
+∞ if N susi < N inni and N susi = 0
(5.27)
Four metrics for measuring the quality of clustering have previously been introduced
(74). They are purity, normalized mutual information, rand index and F measure.
Purity is used in our work due to its simplicity and easy-understandability. To compute
the purity metric, each cluster is assigned a label according to the occurrence of the
most frequently observed annotated reviewers within the cluster. In Fig. 5.38, there
are three clusters (C1, C2 and C3) and two labels (innocent and suspicious). The
accuracy of the assignment is measured by counting the number of correctly assigned
reviewers and dividing by the number of annotations. Purity is formalized in formula
5.28, where Ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωk} is the set of clusters, L = {l1, l2, ..., lj} is the set of
labels and N is the number of annotations. For the example in Fig. 5.38, purity is
(5 + 3 + 1)/13 ≈ 0.62.
purity(Ω, L) =
1
N
∑
k
max
j
|ωk ∩ lj | (5.28)
5.3.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we show the candidates of innocent and suspicious reviewers. Different
feature types for innocent and suspicious reviewers are compared. Particularly we
introduce two metrics, degree correlation knn (94) and degree distribution P (k) (95) to
show the social network information of innocent and suspicious reviewers.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K-means clustering
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5.3.4.1 AAClust Learning Results
In order to select candidate suspicious reviewers, we manually annotated 168 suspicious
and 56 innocent reviewers. Then we performed supervised learning (SVMs) using the
224 annotations. As we expected, the supervised learning results have as low as 68%
accuracy. The reason why the supervised learning results are poor is that, the quantity
of the annotated set is too small.
Using AAClust, we cluster all the 78,378 reviewers using K-means considering the
parameters such as seed and number of clusters with different values. thratio is set to
10, which means the number of reviewers with one type of label (either suspicious or
innocent) are 10 times larger than that with the other type. After the fixing of thratio,
the candidates of suspicious and innocent clusters are selected. Meanwhile, we accept
only cluster where purity is higher than 75%. We identify 9045 suspicious and 42351
innocent reviewers in the end. There are over 11.5% suspicious reviewers in our dataset.
This number indicates that there are many suspicious reviewers in Dianping.com.
5.3.4.2 Feature Comparison
We compare the distribution of ratings for suspicious reviewers to that of innocent
reviewers. In Dianping.com, a review is composed of a total rating score, a set of rating
scores for features of a service and a textual comment. Features of a service refer to a
refinement of service quality. For instance, a lifestyle-related service like a restaurant
has three features: taste, environment and service. For the distribution of ratings, we
consider only the total rating score of a review.
Figure 5.39: Rating distribution
Comparison of the distribution of ratings is shown in Fig. 5.39. The horizontal axis
represents rating distribution, which is an integer between one and five. The vertical
axis represents the proportion of reviews providing a certain rating score. The two
different groups are color coded. The suspicious group which is composed of all the
identified suspicious reviewers is in blue; the innocent group is in red. The distributions
of two groups look very similar; the suspicious group has slightly more extreme ratings
(e.g. rating one and five) than the innocent group. The rating in a review does not
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play a role in manipulation because Dianping does not have a strong trust management
system. In Dianping, a fraudulent review concentrates more on constructing the textual
comment.
In Dianping.com, reviewers are strongly related via a social network. There are two
types of social relationships. The first type is a friendship. A reviewer can request
or accept a friendship with other reviewers. The second type is a flower relation. A
reviewer can send a flower to another reviewer in order to present a sense of complement
to the reviewer who posts a nice review. Here we explore the character of the two
types of social network regarding the suspicious and innocent reviewers identified using
AAClust.
We introduce degree distribution P (k) (95) and degree correlation knn (94) to an-
alyze the topology of the social network in Dianping.com. A power-law degree distri-
bution, P (k) ∼ kγ , where k is the node degree, attest to the existence of a relatively
small number of nodes with a very large number of relations. The degree distribution
P (k) is plotted as a complementary cumulative probability function (CCDF), which is
given by formula 5.29.
F¯ (x) = P (X > x) = 1− F (x) (5.29)
The degree correlation, knn, is a mapping between node out-degree k and the av-
erage in-degree of neighbors of nodes with out-degree k. An increasing knn indicates
a tendency that higher-degree nodes connect to other high-degree nodes; a decreasing
knn represents the opposite trend.
Figure 5.40: Degree distribution for friendship
Fig 5.40, 5.41 and 5.42 are log-log plots of the degree distribution for friendship
degree, in-degree and out-degree respectively. In a directed graph, the degree of a
node is equal to the sum of in-degree and out-degree of the node. The horizontal
axis represents the degree k; the vertical axis represents P (k). The innocent reviewers
group is shown in blue; the suspicious group is shown in red. The three figures show
three common phenomena. The first phenomenon is that both two groups show general
power-law character. The second phenomenon is that, the innocent group has more
reviewers whose degree is larger than the suspicious group. This phenomenon is shown
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again in Fig. 5.41, where the in-degree of reviewers in the suspicious group is less
than 100, while that in the innocent group is approaching 10000. This phenomenon
implies that there are fewer reviewers connected to suspicious reviewers than to innocent
reviewers. The third phenomenon is that the line of CCDF for the suspicious reviewers
decreases faster than that of the innocent reviewers. This phenomenon implies that
innocent reviewers have larger degree than the suspicious reviewers, which is a positive
sign for system robustness, because the suspicious reviewers do not have as large a
social influence as the innocent reviewers.
Figure 5.41: In-degree distribution for friendship
Figure 5.42: Out-degree distribution for friendship
Fig 5.43, 5.44 and 5.45 plot the distributions for the flower relationships: degree, in-
degree and out-degree, respectively. In all the three figures, we can see that the flower
relationship doesn’t follow a power-law distribution, because the number of reviewers
whose degree is equal to one is extremely large. Most of the reviewers in Dianping give
or receive only one flower to or from other reviewers. In addition, from Fig. 5.44 we can
see that, when in-degree is smaller than 40, both groups have the similar distributions
regarding the in-degree. Similarly to friendship, the line of CCDF for the suspicious
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Figure 5.43: Degree distribution for flower relationships
reviewers decreases faster than that of the innocent reviewers. In other words: the
innocent reviewers have larger degree than the suspicious reviewers.
Figure 5.44: In-degree distribution for flower relationships
Fig. 5.46 shows the degree correlation knn for friendship. In the figure, the degree
correlation for the two reviewer groups, innocent and suspicious, decreases when degree
k increases. The decrease implies that there are a few extremely popular reviewers in
Dianping.com to whom many unpopular reviewers connect. In addition, we can see that
the innocent reviewers have extremely high knn when degree k is smaller than ten. The
suspicious reviewers generally have smaller knn. This tells us that the suspicious group
contains much less unpopular reviewers than the innocent group. The knn regarding
innocent and suspicious groups have a similar shape.
Fig. 5.47 shows the degree correlation knn for flower relationships. knn of the
innocent reviewers stays almost still. On the other hand, knn of the suspicious reviewers
decreases rapidly when degree k increases. Particularly when degree k is larger than
ten, knn is approaching one. It implies that the flower which a popular suspicious
reviewer sends to another reviewer is mainly the only flower the reviewer receives.
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Figure 5.45: Out-degree distribution for flower relationships
Figure 5.46: Degree correlation for friendship
Figure 5.47: Degree correlation for flower relationships
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In this section we investigate the manipulative behavior of reviewers in Dian-
ping.com. A subset of reviewers in Dianping is collected using Breadth-first search
(BFS). Features regarding clustering are specified in section 5.3.2 and a small number
of reviewers are manually annotated. Annotation-Auxiliary Clustering (AAClust) is
proposed for identifying suspicious reviewers regarding manipulation. The comparison
result between distributions of rating provided by suspicious reviewers and innocent
reviewers shows that the distributions look very similar. This similarity tells us that in
Dianping suspicious reviewers do not concentrate mainly on the biased ratings but tex-
tual comments. In addition, two social network metrics degree distribution P (k) (95)
and degree correlation knn (94) are introduced to analyze the topology of the social
network in Dianping.com. The analysis results show that the innocent reviewers have
larger degree than the suspicious reviewers and the flower which a popular suspicious
reviewer sends to another reviewer is mainly the only flower the reviewer receives.
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6Conclusion and Discussion
6.1 Summary
Given a large amount of user-generated information (ratings, observations, experiences
or evidences) for a service, this thesis investigates the idea of trust measures to solve the
problem of service selection by mapping the multi-dimension user-generated informa-
tion into a single value or a vector. 40 trust models (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38) proposed
by other researchers are compared from both theoretical and practical perspectives us-
ing criteria such as application context, information representation, properties of trust
evaluation, and robustness of system. A trust model framework is proposed that gen-
eralizes the core of a trust model. In addition, we propose six metrics for measuring
the confidence of trust evaluation at system and query level. A combination of trust
value and the corresponding confidence in the trust value helps users to select services
more reliable.
We study trust building and management for both quantitative and qualitative
services. We choose an Online File Storage Service (OFSS) as a case study for a
quantitative service. Trust models for an OFSS consider the attributes of failure rate
and bandwidth. Two manipulation detection approaches, Baseline Sampling (BS) and
Clique Identification (CI) are proposed to mitigate the negative influence of manipu-
lation on the Trust Management System (TMS) for the OFSS. A simulation platform
is designed and simulation results show that both BS and CI suppress the influence of
manipulation largely, where CI outperforms BS for each of three types of manipulation,
promoting manipulation, slandering manipulation, and mixed promoting and slander-
ing manipulation. For qualitative services, we study three instances, an e-commerce
website Taobao.com, a travel-related-service-review website TripAdvisor.com, and a
lifestyle-related-service-review website Dianping.com. Considering different characters
of the three instances, different criteria such as price of a transaction, frequency of trad-
ing, suspicious degree of a reviewer are used to design weighting functions. We propose
two universal approaches, Ranking Comparison Index (RCI) and Benefit Variation Ra-
tio (BVR), for comparing the robustness of trust models given a set of suspicious objects
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such as vendors and hotels. Trust models are compared using RCI or BVR, and the
results show that our proposed trust models outperform the baseline trust model. In
addition, for qualitative services, we propose three types of machine learning approach,
clustering, classification, and semi-unsupervised learning, for identifying suspicious ob-
jects with respect to manipulation. Afterwards, the statistical character of features
in the suspicious group, and innocent group, such as the rating distribution, rating
helpfulness, service ranking, are compared.
6.2 Remaining Challenges
6.2.1 Formalization of a TMS
The purpose of TMS formalization is to analyze the properties of a TMS such as
accuracy. TMS formalization refers to model a TMS as a formal system based on
mathematics. The accuracy of a TMS is a critical issue, since a TMS becomes useless
when the system delivers inaccurate results. The first step of formalization is to identify
the key variables in a TMS such as a rating of a service, the consumer set, the service
set, etc. Then a metric or metrics should be defined to measure the quantity of a
property. For the property of TMS accuracy, we define mismatch of a TMS at time t as
the metric in Section 3.1.3. Next, mathematical statements are proposed and proved
based on the definitions above. In Section 3.1.3, we proved two lemmas for accuracy
of a TMS given the restriction that all the rating images and labels never change over
time. However a statement becomes extremely difficult to prove when we try to relax
the restriction. The difficulty lies in how to model manipulation and evaluation of a
TMS per se. For manipulation modeling, the key factors are the types of manipulation
and the strength of manipulation. For evaluation of a TMS, we shall model how the
rating image varies over time and this is largely dependent on the design of a trust
model. Given different weight functions, TMSs evaluate trust differently over time. We
argue that, the proof on a property of a universal TMS such as accuracy is impossible.
However it is possible to prove a property of a concrete TMS where the modeling of
manipulation and weight functions are fixed.
6.2.2 The Identity Problem
There is not a correspondence between one person and their identity on the Internet.
Users typically create multiple accounts for different websites and currently there is few
mechanisms relating the accounts together. Furthermore, users can generate multiple
accounts for review websites such as TripAdvisor.com and Dianping.com and theoreti-
cally there is no way to group the accounts accurately. The ambiguity of identity on the
Internet causes difficulty for identifying manipulation. One dishonest person can create
multiple accounts and post positive reviews for the same hotel property. Additionally,
in order to promote one service, a group of people could take action on the same target
where each person has multiple accounts.
Instead of identifying the correspondence between suspicious accounts and one per-
son, we should focus on the behavioral characteristics of a group of accounts. For
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instance, in the same day there are five accounts which post five reviews for the same
service from the same IP address. In order to capture the behavioral character of a
group of accounts, the detection method should collect the history of behavior for an
account and analyze them. For instance, currently Google only allows registered users
to post reviews in the Google Play online store1. Anonymous users whose behavior
history is untraceable are restricted from posting reviews.
Looking into the future, with the development of the Internet, the identity of one
person in the physical world could eventually be mapped into the virtual space. Until
then, the strength of the manipulation will be largely restricted, since one cannot create
multiple virtual identities online arbitrarily. TMSs will be playing a more significant
role for service provisioning than currently, since the trust in the real world can be
completely imported into the virtual world.
6.2.3 Evaluating a Trust Model
The main approach of evaluating a trust model introduced in the research work (15,
16, 17, 33, 75) is based on a user-service matrix where each entry represents the rating
a user gives to a service. The matrix is not completely filled, since a user will not
typically use all the services. The user-service matrix is therefore a sparse matrix. For
instance, in the case of recommender systems (33, 75), the matrix is instantiated as a
user-movie or user-product matrix. For instance, a user-product matrix in Amazon.com
is a typical sparse matrix. In order to evaluate a trust model, the values of some entries
are selected and hidden. Afterwards, the prediction of these values is made by applying
the trust model on the remaining entries. The goal is to check whether the trust model
can make an accurate prediction on the selected entries where the data is hidden. The
main weakness of using a user-service matrix for trust model evaluation is that time is
not taken into account during the process of trust model evaluation. Evaluation based
on a user-service matrix might work if the service quality does not vary over time for
example, in the case of movies and products. However, due to the dynamics of service
quality, evaluation based on a user-service matrix might not perform well. For instance,
for trust evaluation of a hotel (service), it is illogical to predict an entry that is one
year old by considering the entries generated one week ago. Therefore we should select
entries very carefully to avoid logical inconsistencies.
A good way of evaluating a trust model is to compare the prediction and the rat-
ing given by the evaluator afterwards. There is a strong correspondence between the
trust model applied, the ratings used for evaluating trust and the rating given by the
evaluator afterwards. Since the decision of choosing one service largely depends on the
trust evaluation result provided by the trust model and the result is generated from
the available ratings at that moment. After the evaluator (user) used the service, they
generate a rating for the service. This feedback-based evaluation approach is a practical
one and it is not labor-saving to apply this approach for research.
1http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/app-bewertungen-google-vermaehlt-plus-und-play-a-
871065.html
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6.2.4 Application of Trust Models in Industry
Once a new trust model has been developed, how can the model be integrated into
the current TMS? This is one of the key problems which hinder the upgrade of a TMS
running in industry. For instance, previous work (4, 96, 97) has mentioned a defect in
the trust model used by eBay. The trust value is calculated by summing up all the
ratings. A positive rating is equal to +1; a negative rating is equal to -1; a neutral
rating is equal to zero. We all see the defect that eBay simply treats all the ratings
equally. The current problem is that how can we improve the original trust model used
by eBay in practice?
The trust model framework introduced in Chapter 3 can solve the problem. The
basic idea of the framework is to give different ratings different weights and calculate
the average. The basic operation of a trust model is to compute the average like the
trust model used by eBay does. We can improve the trust model by giving different
weights to different observations. Therefore all trust models which implement the trust
model framework can easily replace the original trust model employed by eBay. The
only work one should do is to design new weight functions.
6.2.5 Low Incentive to Provide a Rating
Five years ago, Audun Jøsangs survey (4) pointed out that users lack motivation to
provide ratings. In the paper, the authors mentioned that Epinions1 and BizRate2
provided financial incentives such as discounts or cash incentives. In order to solve the
data sparsity, TripAdvisor.com asks user to rate the hotels using a pop-up web page
when someone opens its homepage. TripAdvisor.com’s approach is not a good way
to solve the problem since people usually do not like to be disturbed in this way. A
combination of social network and rating provisioning could be one way to solve the
problem. The motivation of writing or providing a review a rating shows friends where
they have travelled and how they feel about services such as Google+3. A social-
network-based TMS can extract trust evaluation related information using Opinion
Mining, Text Mining, Web Ontology Language, etc. The basic idea is to explicitly
or implicitly obtain the evaluation of a service from an end user and build a TMS
afterwards.
6.2.6 Purposeless Attack identification
Purposeless attack refers to an attack the intention of which is not explicit or hidden.
For instance, one might post a review of a hotel with random words to the system.
Or in order to destroy one TMS, one could inject random ratings to the TMS with-
out any explicit pattern. The real motivation behind the destructive behavior could
be that, there are two TMSs and one tries to destroy the other one. This type of
1www.epinions.com
2www.bizrate.com
3https://plus.google.com
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from the user end might be different from region to region. We should give more weight
to the referrals who are similar to the evaluator with respect to the network contexts
such as IP prefix and geographical location.
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